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INTRODUCTION
This overview of West Virginia law covers cases decided
from August 1, 1980 through August 1, 1981. Approximately 200
cases were decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals during this period; approximately 50 are discussed in this
survey.
Although West Virginia is said to have one of the lowest
crime rates in the country, criminal law remains a significant
area of growth and change. The commission of a single crime
sets in motion hundreds of people in police, circuit court, and
corrections agencies. The rules and procedures that must be
followed by these people are set or passed upon by the supreme
court. This year's decisions include important law in the area of
juvenile justice and psychiatric defenses.
In contrast to criminal law, the active machinery of justice is
only rarely set in full motion by a domestic relations case. Most
are settled privately, with only the formal imprimatur of the cir-
cuit court. However, the rules that control the private resolu-
tions are again set by the supreme court. This year's decisions
on child custody and property settlements will be felt in hun-
dreds of cases.
One senses from this year's cases that circuit courts have
not been adequately equipped to handle employment issues.
Therefore the supreme court has decided a number of cases that
will provide "law to apply" in the lower courts and by employing
agencies.
A far cry from a job dismissal, the proper search of an
automobile, or a property settlement in a divorce, are issues like
the statewide funding of schools, and the legislative veto of ad-
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ministrative regulations. The court has spoken on these latter
issues as well, issues going to the fundamental dynamics of our
state government.
The work of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
during the survey period is the strongest evidence of a healthy
and vital pluralism in American jurisprudence. The decisions are
intelligent, creative, and solid. It has been a pleasure to follow
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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
INVENTORY SEARCHES
Deciding an issue of first impression in West Virginia, the
supreme court in State v. Goff' established standards for deter-
mining when a warrantless search of a detained suspect's aban-
doned automobile satisfies constitutional protections against
unreasonable search and seizure. According to the court, four
factors must be present for the inventory search to pass muster:
(1) the automobile must be lawfully impounded; (2) the driver
must not be present at the time of the search to make alter-
' 272 S.E.2d 457 (W. Va. 1980). The court confronted a recurring problem in
State v. Goff besides the inventory search issue. That problem was the ap-
propriate instruction to be given to the jury on the presumption of innocence
which attaches to criminal defendants and the state's burden of proof. To lay the
issue to rest, the court offered a standard instruction for future criminal pro-
ceedings:
The law presumes a defendant to be innocent of crime. Thus a
defendant, although accused, begins the trial with a "clean slate"-with
no evidence against him. And the law permits nothing but legal
evidence presented before the jury to be considered in support of any
charge against the accused. So the presumption of innocence alone is
sufficient to acquit a defendant, unless the jurors are satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt after careful and impartial
consideration of all the evidence in the case.
It is not required that the government prove guilt beyond all possi-
ble doubt. The test is one of reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a
doubt based upon reason and common sense-the kind of doubt that
would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, therefore, must be proof of such a convincing
character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely and act
upon it.
The jury will remember that a defendant is never to be convicted
on mere suspicion or conjecture.
The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts to a defendant; for the law
never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of
calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.
So if the jury, after careful and impartial consideration of all the
evidence in the case, has a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty
of the charge, it must acquit. If the jury views the evidence in the case
as reasonably permitting either of two conclusions-one of innocence,
the otlher of guilt-the jury should of course adopt the conclusion of in-
nocence.
This instruction is almost identical to the widely used federal instruction, 1
E. Devitt & C. Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions §11.14. 272
S.E.2d at 463 n.9.
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native arrangements for the safekeeping of his belongings; (3)
the inventory search must be necessitated by the presence of
valuable items in plain view; and (4) the police must not be using
the inventory motive as a pretext for an investigative search of
the automobile.
Even when the foregoing are present, Goff limits the inven-
tory search to those parts of the automobile which are un-
secured. Exploration of locked trunks, sealed containers or
other secured portions of the automobile are expressly pro-
hibited. To the high court, the only legitimate purpose of the in-
ventory search is to protect the property of the individual in
custody. If a search extends beyond the reasonable means to
achieve this purpose, then it is clearly violative of the suspect's
constitutional rights.
Goff should be read as disfavoring the acquisition of in-
culpatory evidence through inventory seardhes. The court has
made it clear in a number of recent decisions that any type of
warrantless search runs afoul of the state constitution, unless it
falls into a limited number of carefully defined exceptions.
These exceptions are "jealously and carefully drawn"' and re-
quire "a showing by those who seek exemption ... that the ex-
igencies of the situation [make] that course imperative.",, The
class of exceptions includes a search incident to an arrest; a
search of materials found in plain view of the officer; and a
search culminating from a lawful stopping of an automobile
which reveals probable cause to believe the automobile contains
illegal materials.'
All the recognized exceptions to the warrantless search pro-
hibition are premised on the existence of exigent circumstances
which make securing a warrant impractical. In the case of im-
poundment, where the vehicle is under the dominion of police
authorities, the exigent circumstances for justifying an intrusion
into a constitutionally protected realm are not present.5 Thus,
2 State v. Duvernoy, 156 W. Va. 578, 583, 195 S.E.2d 631, 635 (1973) quoting
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,455 (1971).
3Id
State v. Frisby, 245 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1978) cert. denied 439 U.S. 1127
(1979) (warrantless search of automobile); State v. Stone, 268 S.E.2d 50 (M. Va.
1980) (plain view doctrine); State v. Moore, 272 S.E.2d 804 (W. Va. 1980) (general
discussion of all exceptions, including search incident to an arrest).
I State v. Goff, 272 S.E.2d 457 (W. Va. 1980).
[Vol. 84
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before engaging in inventory searches which have even an in-
cidental investigatory purpose, Goff would counsel acquiring the
proper search warrants to save any evidence found in the auto-
mobile from exclusion at the trial.
Warrants Obtained through Confidential Informants
In State v. Dudick,6 decided six years ago, the supreme
court set the standard for the issuance of search warrants on
the basis of representations made by confidential informants.
The Dudick standard requires that search warrants set forth
facts both supporting the reliability of the informant and detail-
ing how that reliability was established. In the court's mind, this
information on the face of the warrant is necessary to ensure
that the issuing party makes an independent determination on
the existence of probable cause before the intrusion into the
suspect's privacy was authorized.
The supreme court ran afoul of its Dudick standard in the
recent case of State v. White.' There, a magistrate had issued a
search warrant for marihuana and other controlled substances
based on the representations made by a reliable informant to a
deputy sheriff. Although the warrant stated that the informant
had personally viewed a quantity of the illegal substances, it
contained no facts bearing on the reliability of the informant or
on the means employed to independently determine reliability.
The high court, nevertheless, upheld the validity of the search
warrant. In a seeming departure from Dudick, the court said
that "an averment that the informant was an eyewitness to par-
ticular criminal activities involving particular individuals in a
particular place is alone sufficient to permit the issuance of a
valid search warrant."8
White is more accurately characterized as a stumble by the
court rather than a retreat from Dudick. The decision makes it
clear that a search warrant which details the reliability of the in-
formant is still the preferred model and that no degree of facial
completeness will save a warrant where the issuing party has
failed to independently determine probable cause. Thus the
basic protections of Dudick are preserved, even though the
court is apparently now prepared to accept a lesser degree of
technical completeness in some cases.
1 213 S.E.2d 458 (W. Va. 1975).
7 280 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1981).
1 Id. at 118.
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PSYCHIATRIC DEFENSES
The issue of a defendant's sanity is critical at three stages of
the criminal proceeding: (1) the time of the offense; (2) the time
of the trial; and (3) the time of sentencing or, in the case of a
defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity, the time of the
involuntary commitment procedures. During the survey period,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals decided an unusually
large number of cases involving the procedural rights of defen-
dants at these critical stages. Consistent with its activist reputa-
tion, the court broke new ground on the rights of fugitives to pre-
extradition mental evaluations, liberalized procedural rules with
respect to the insanity defense, and reaffirmed controversial
decisions requiring the prosecution to prove a defendant's sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt. But for all its labors, the court failed
to still the turbulence set in motion by its earlier decisions
overhauling West Virginia's law with respect to the insanity
defense. The recent decisions provide some signposts for pro-
secutors, trial judges and defense attorneys, but the signposts
mark dark and unfamiliar highways.
Mental State at the Time of the Offense
-Prior to the Edwards v. Leverette1 ruling in 1979, West
Virginia considered insanity to fall within the class of affir-
mative defenses. A defendant seeking to avoid criminal respon-
sibility by reason of insanity was required to prove by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence that he suffered from a "mental dis-
ease or defect causing the accused to lack the capacity either to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his act, or to conform his act to
the requirements of law."12 To carry the burden of persuasion on
mental deficiency, the defendant essentially had to admit to the
illegal act, and then seek to justify or excuse the offense because
of insanity. This combination of a heavy burden of proof and a
virtual confession on the material elements of the crime made
insanity an unattractive defense.
Leverette significantly revised the operation of the insanity
defense. Relying on United States Supreme Court rulings,' the
258 S.E.2d 436 (W. Va. 1979).
State v. Myers, 222 S.E.2d 300, 305 (W. Va. 1976) (quoting State v. Grimm,
156 W. Va. 615, 632, 195 S.E.2d 637, 647 (1973)).
' See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (upheld the constitutionality
of affirmative defenses); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (struck down
[Vol. 84
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West Virginia high court in Leverette lowered the standard of
proof required to make a defense of insanity from preponderant
evidence to "some evidence fairly raising doubt on the issue of
insanity."' Although it did not define the boundaries of this new
evidentiary standard, the court made it clear that, once this
burden is satisfied, the presumption of sanity disappears and
the prosecution must prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was sane at the time of the offense."5
During the survey period, the court decided two cases clari-
fying its revised position on the insanity defense. In State v.
Grimm' and State v. Daggett,' the court applied the Leverette
standard retroactively in reversing the convictions of two defen-
dants found guilty of murder and first degree sexual assualt, re-
spectively. The trial judge in both Grimm and Daggett had
given jury instructions which had characterized West Virginia
law as requiring preponderant proof on defendant insanity be-
fore the offense could be excused. Upon review, the high court
reaffirmed Leverette, holding that once the defendant fairly
raises doubt on the issue of insanity, the state must prove crim-
inal responsibility. Noting that Leverette was not the law at the
time of the trials in Grimm and Daggett, the high court
restricted the retroactive effect of the fairly raising doubt stan-
dard to those earlier cases where the defense counsel properly
objected to the delivered instructions on the insanity defense
and thus preserved the issue for appeal.'
In neither of the above cases has the court clarified what the
presumptions in criminal trials which relieved the prosecution of the burden of
proving material elements); Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895) (state can-
not strap the defendant with an unreasonable burden in proving insanity
defense).
258 S.E.2d at 440. Citing City of Collins v. Tennessee 506 S.W.2d 179
(Tenn. App. 1973) with approval, the court said that if any evidence is introduced
fairly raising doubt on the issue of defendant's sanity at the time of the offense, the
presumption of sanity disappears and the state has the burden to prove sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt. The court expressly held this to be the new rule in
West Virginia, but limited its retroactive effect to those cases where an objection
to the instructions on the burden of proof in making an insanity defense was pro-
perly raised.
5 I&
o 270 S.E.2d 173 (W. Va. 1980).
280 S.E.2d 545 (W. Va. 1981).
State v. Daggett, 280 S.E.2d 545 (W. Va. 1981); State v. Grimm, 270 S.E.2d
173 (W. Va. 1980).
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boundaries of the fairly raising doubt standard are. Grimm and
Daggett both involved expert psychiatric testimony that was in-
troduced by defendants who thought the burden of persuasion
was on their shoulders. But it is not clear that future defendants
need go this far to shift the responsibility of proving sanity to
the state. If the court adheres to standards it has formulated in
the analogous setting of pretrial competency hearings,9 it may
be possible for a defendant simply to produce lay testimony on
anomalous behavior or to introduce documentation of past men-
tal treatment to destroy the presumption of sanity. The fairly
raising doubt standard is even broad enough to be satisfied by
the mere allegation of mental deficiency by the defendant.
Whatever definition the court ultimately gives to the revised
standard of proof on insanity, the present uncertainty surroun-
ding its application to the criminal trial is certain to encourage
the use of the defense of insanity. Tactically, the more the state
has to prove, the better the chance for acquittal; hence, defense
attorneys will likely see the criminal responsibility issue as a
means of strapping the prosecution with an additional element
to prove. This increasing usage of the insanity defense is certain
to produce some adverse effects on the criminal justice system.
Trials, for example, will be lengthened because of the time re-
quired to subject defendants to routine psychiatric evaluations.
The cost of trials will also significantly increase as expert
medical testimony becomes an integral part of the inquiry into
the sanity of the defendant. Finally, the jury will be asked to
routinely step beyond the fact-finding realm to evaluate complex
and often contradictory medical evidence bearing on the mental
capacity of the defendant.
Longer trials, added court costs and an expanded role for
the jury are largely matters of convenience. Though important
9 In State v. Demastus, 270 S.E.2d 649 (W. Va. 1980), the court ruled that a
trial judge must order a pretrial psychiatric evaluation when he knows that a
criminal defendant has a history of mental illness. The court went on to
enumerate an exhaustive list of the ways a trial judge may be made aware of a
defendant's possible mental incompetency, including a lawyer's representation
concerning the competence of his client, documented proof of mental disturbance,
or psychiatric and lay testimony about anomalous behavior. Since this type of in-
formation is sufficient to trigger psychiatric evaluation at pretrial, the court is
likely to see these same sources of information as sufficient to fairly raise doubt
on the issue of criminal responsibility at the time of the offense.
[Vol. 84
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in a practical sense, they are not the types of institutional effect
which deserve consideration before making a significant change
in our insanity law. But the court's recent decisions do more
than inconvenience judges and deplete public coffers; they chart
a dramatically different course for our penal system. For at the
heart of the court's overhauling of the insanity defense is an ap-
parent sociological judgment that criminal behavior is indicative
of mental deficiency. The relaxation of the standard of proof for
making a valid insanity defense, and the recent decisions making
a pretrial psychiatric evaluation a virtual right for every crim-
inal defendant, are clear evidences of this judgment. In these
decisions the court has expressed a preference for treatment
over punishment and for hospitalization over incarceration. The
danger created by this preference is not that hardened criminals
will be able to use the revised insanity defense as a shovel for
burrowing under the prison wall. Rather, it. is that the court is
transferring the same problems which plague our penal
system- overcrowding, understaffing, lack of meaningful train-
ing programs and inappropriate rehabilitation attitudes-to the
state hospital.
Competency at the Time of the Proceedings
The circumstances under which a trial judge must order a
pretrial psychiatric examination has been the subject of several
important decisions during the survey period. Prior to these
decisions, the law permitted the trial judge to exercise his dis-
cretion regarding pretrial inquiry into the competency of a crim-
inal defendant. The recent decisions continue to recognize the
trial court's discretion, but provide clearer guidelines on when
psychiatric evaluations are required.
Pretrial Evaluations
The lead case in this area is State v. Demastus.0 There, the
trial court refused a motion for a pretrial psychiatric evaluation,
even though the defendant had a history of mental treatment. In
reversing the conviction, the supreme court ruled that "[w]hen-
ever a court knows that a criminal defendant has a recent history
of mental illness, it is an abuse of its discretion not to afford him
or her an opportunity for psychiatric evaluation."*" According to
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the court, a trial judge may be made aware of problems relating
to defendant competency from a range of sources, including the
defendant's attorney, anomalous behavior observed by the judge
or professional and lay testimony introduced to support the
claim of mental deficiency.
Demastus moved the court in the direction of requiring men-
tal evaluation for all criminal defendants. A further step in this
direction was taken in a later case, State v. Pauley.12 There, the
trial judge refused a motion by the defense attorney which would
have allowed the defendant to undergo psychiatric evaluation. Il-
lustrating the breadth of its Demastus ruling, the supreme court
of appeals awarded a new trial in Pauley, even though the only
evidence bearing on the mental deficiencies of the defendant
was his attorney's request for psychiatric evaluation.
Read together, Demastus and Pauley greatly restrict the
trial judge's discretion with respect to ordering mental evalua-
tions. The emerging rule compels an inquiry into the compet-
ence of a criminal defendant when the trial judge has any reason
to doubt the defendant's ability to actively and ably participate
in his defense. The new rule not only specifies under what condi-
tions the trial judge's discretion will be preempted, but it also
imposes an affirmative duty on the judge to insure all defen-
dants are competent to understand the nature and object of the
criminal proceedings. Although the boundaries of this duty have
yet to be defined, the supreme court has said that the trial judge
is under no obligation to force an unwilling defendant to submit
to psychiatric testing, where there is no evidence to suggest
that his r.efusal flows from a mental defect.13
Evaluations Before Extradition
Equating the extradition hearing with a criminal trial, the
court in State ex rel Jones v. Warmuth" extended the right of
prehearing psychiatric evaluation to fugitives facing extradi-
tion. Historically, West Virginia has followed guidelines set out
by the United States Supreme Court,5 limiting the asylum state
" 276 S.E.2d 792 (W. Va. 1981).
" State v. Myers, 280 S.E.2d 299 (W. Va. 1981).
272 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1980).
15 Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1978). West Virginia recognized the same
limitations on the matters to be taken up in the extradition hearing in State ex
rel Gonzales v. Wilt, 256 S.E.2d 15 (W. Va. 1979).
[Vol. 84
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to the consideration of four factors during the extradition hear-
ing: (1) whether the extradition documents are facially complete;
(2) whether a crime has been alleged in the demanding state; (3)
whether the detainee is the person named in the extradition re-
quest; and (4) whether the person was in the demanding state at
the time of the offense. In Warmuth, the West Virginia high
court recognized that, despite the limited scope of the asylum
state's inquiry, the extradition court must nevertheless accord
the fugitive procedural rights commensurate with his threatened
liberty interests. If the asylum state should determine that the de-
tained person was not in the demanding state at the time of the
alleged offense or that a mistake in identity has occurred, the
extradition hearing could result in his release from custody. To
the state supreme court, this potential for exoneration through
the extradition hearing amounts to a substantial liberty interest
which entitles the fugitive to participate competently in the pro-
ceedings.
The Warmuth decision represents new law in West Virginia.
Fugitives may now contest their ability to participate in extradi-
tion hearings to the same extent that criminal defendants may
challenge their competency to stand trial. In practical terms, this
means that any time a fugitive or his attorney raises the issue
the extradition court must order prehearing psychiatric evalua-
tions. If these evaluations satisfy the court by preponderant
evidence that the fugitive is unable to understand the nature of
the proceedings or to confer effectively with counsel, then the
hearings may be delayed until the fugitive regains his sanity. In
the interim, the state may seek to commit the fugitive under the
state's involuntary civil commitment statute.
Competency Hearings
Pretrial inquiries into the defendant's ability to understand
the nature of the proceedings against him inevitably reveal
something about his mental state at the time of the offenses.
The pretrial psychiatric findings are usually the building blocks
of the insanity defense. In recognition of this relationship be-
tween the pretrial competency hearing and the ultimate defense
of insanity, the high court ruled in Walton v. Casey16 that a
criminal trial is unwarranted when the pretrial hearing clearly
" 258 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1979).
1982]
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reveals that the accused lacked the requisite competency to be
criminally responsible for his offense. Under Casey, a trial judge
had a duty to determine initially whether the defendant had a
bonafide insanity defense and to dismiss the charges if, by pre-
ponderant evidence, such a defense was found to exist.
In State ex reL Smith v. Scott,1 7 the supreme court retreated
from the Casey directive. Pointing to civil commitment sections
of the West Virginia Code, the high court distinguished between
a hearing to determine defendant competency and a proceeding
to decide the defense of insanity. A competency hearing, the
court said, is largely a medical inquiry into the defendant's ability
to understand the object and nature of the criminal proceedings.
A proceeding to determine whether a defendant is criminally
responsible for his actions, on the other hand, is more than a
medical inquiry; it involves a weighing of moral, legal and social
considerations in addition to the medical factors. Its purpose is
to determine culpability, not competency, which makes it a deci-
sion properly reserved for the trial. To the high court in Scott,
this distinction in functions is sufficient to justify a trial court's
refusal to consider the validity of a defense of insanity in ad-
vance of the actual trial.18
The Time of Sentencing
Until recently, trial judges retained total control over the
disposition of criminal defendants raising the insanity defense.
Requests for instructions to the jury on the disposition of insane
defendants were routinely denied on the grounds that the jury's
role was confined to deciding the merits of the insanity defense,
while the trial court was left to decide what the law requires
once the defense is proved. 9 State v. Knuckolls0 changed this
practice. Equating its new position on disposition instruction
with its recently announced rule on parole eligibility, the
supreme court in Knuckolls said that defense counsel must be
allowed "to argue the consequences of finding a defendant not
guilty by reason of insanity." As part of its presentation of this
argument, the defense is entitled to an instruction which cor-
rectly states the law and which presents the proposition in a
17 280 S.E.2d 811 (W. Va. 1979).
MId. at 814.
'9 State v. Grimm, 156 W. Va. 615, 195 S.E.2d 637 (1973).
273 S.E.2d 87 (W. Va. 1980).
[Vol. 84
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manner favorable to his claim of insanity. The request for such
an instruction is a tactical decision for the defense, which the
trial court must grant if the proffered instruction comports with
the law.
Knuckolls will be criticized because it thrusts the jury into a
province formerly reserved for the court. But the intrusive
dimensions of the Knuckolls case are outweighed by its poten-
tial for creating a climate in which an intelligent consideration
of the insanity defense can proceed.
In cases where the insanity defense is raised, juries can
decide to acquit, to find guilty or to find not guilty by reason of
insanity. The implications of the first two verdicts are not lost
on jurors, even without the benefit of elaborate instructions.
But the implications of the insanity verdict can be a source of
genuine confusion. Without appropriate instructions, jurors are
left to speculate about the fate of the defendant should a not
guilty by reason of insanity verdict be returned. They may in-
correctly believe that such a verdict means the defendant will
be immediately re-introduced into the community or that he will
be denied the medical treatment he would otherwise receive if
incarcerated. In either case, the confusion which attaches to the
insanity verdict predisposes jurors to reject it in favor of the
more easily grasped guilty or not guilty verdicts.21 This
pre-disposition creates the danger that jurors will vote for convic-
tion in close cases, even though the defendant was not criminally
responsible for his acts.
Knuckolls does little more than remove jurors' tendency to
vote for what they understand over what they do not understand.
Viewed in this light, the decision does not represent an en-
croachment on a trial judge's authority as much as an attempt to
ensure that the criminal defendant gets a fair and informed con-
sideration of his insanity defense.
Summary
The high court's decisions during the survey period have
wrought some fundamental changes in the operations of the crim-
inal justice system. A trial judge must now grant psychiatric ex-
aminations upon request as part of his duty to ensure a criminal
defendant's competency to assist counsel in the preparation of
21 Gray, Insanity Defense: Historical Development and Contemporary
Relevance, 10 Am. CRlM. L. REV. 559 (1972).
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the case. This same right of mental evaluation has been extend-
ed to fugitives contesting extradition and, presumably, to all
other individuals facing state initiated proceedings which could
result in a significant deprivation of personal liberty. Once in
the trial, the defendant may also argue the consequences of an
insanity verdict to the jury, which sharply departs from the
former practice restricting this consideration to the trial judge.
Finally, the defendant need only fairly raise doubt on his mental
state at the time of the offense to destroy the presumption of
sanity which attaches to every criminal defendant and to force




Last year, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
dealt with the recurring problem of protecting prisoner's rights
in accordance with federal and state constitutional requirements.
The first of three noteworthy cases in this area, Harrah v.
Leverette,1 came before the court in the form of a habeas corpus
petition arising out of a 1978 riot (and subsequent "action" taken
by the state) at the Huttonsville medium-security prison. Peti-
tioners were inmates of the facility seeking unconditional
release for deprivation of "due process" and "cruel and unusual
punishment" protections.2
The situation, stated simply, involved a riot instigated and
conducted by unknown inmates and alleged indiscriminate,
unconstitutional measures taken by administrators, correctional
officers, and other employees against the inmate population.
After recounting the details of the ensuing brutality and denial
of rights, the opinion by Justice Harshbarger focuses on three
significant issues: 1) What are the constitutional due process re-
quirements in a prison setting? 2) What are the circumstances
justifying the use of physical force against inmates? 3) What are
the remedies available to those inmates deprived of guaranteed
rights?3
To satisfy due process requirements, the court held that
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disciplinary proceedings must adhere to the same standards
earlier prescribed for the prison setting with regard to placing
prisoners in administrative segregation4 and to transfers within
the penal system.' These requirements are: a) written notice of
the claimed violation, b) disclosure to the inmate of the evidence
against him, c) opportunity to be heard and to present witnesses
and documentary evidence, d) the right to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer spec-
ifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation), e) a
neutral and detached hearing body, f) a written statement by
the fact-finders of the evidence relied on and reasons for dis-
cipline, and g) the right to counsel if the state is represented by
a lawyer." While the court did not offer this list of protections as
a comprehensive guide to afford due process in all situations, it
did find that the inmates in the instant case were denied these
requirements and that the disciplinary proceedings were, there-
fore, unconstitutional and void.7
Addressing the allegations of cruel and unusual punishment,
the court reiterated an earlier prohibition of unnecessary phy-
sical force After condemning the prison administrators' "extra-
ordinary dereliction",' the court forcefully concluded that there
can be no use of physical force on inmates "absent imminent pre-
sent danger of harm to others, themselves, or state property."1
Finally, the court considered the judicial remedies for
deprivation of rights. Although the reluctance to resort to inter-
vention was acknowledged, "the preservation of the rights
vested in every person by our constitution and the federal con-
stitution"1 provided the necessary incentive to overcome that
reluctance. While the court propounded several remedies, there
appear in that list two rather unconventional measures: 1) reduc-
tion in the extent of or time of confinement and 2) mandatory
Tasker v. Griffith, 238 S.E.2d 229 (W. Va. 1977).
Watson v. Whyte, 245 S.E.2d 916 (W. Va. 1978).
o Harrah v. Leverette, 271 S.E.2d at 327, citing Watson v. Whyte, 245
S.E.2d 916 (W. Va. 1978).
Id. at 327-28.
Id at 330, citing State ex rel. K.W. v. Werner, 242 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va.
1978).
10 Id. at 330-31.
It Id. at 331 (emphasis added).
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psychological testing of correctional officers.12 These remedies
are deemed necessary because of the demonstrated ineffec-
tiveness of previous remedial action, such as injunctions and ad-
monitions, and the unresponsiveness of the state Department of
Corrections. More specifically, the court stated, "[w]e have al-
ready exhibited as much tolerance of official abuse of prisoners
as we are capable of.'"l
The outstanding feature of Harrah is the judicial imposition
of remedies previously only threatened. The case marks an ex-
tension of the court's role in protecting prisoner's rights into the
complexities of structuring the prison system to meet those
needs. Justice Harshbarger notes the incongruity in releasing
individuals for reasons that have little or no connection with the
charges for which they were imprisoned." What is not discussed
is how the court intends to factor into its decisions the substan-
tial public interest in keeping criminals incarcerated.
While Harrah is, admittedly, an unusual factual situation,
the scenario may become more familiar as our correctional
systems become more overcrowded and inadequate. Accordingly,
the conflict between the interest of the prisoners and the in-
terest of society is likely to intensify.
In a second prisoner's rights case, Losh v. McKenzie," the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals was asked to consider
the applicability of res judicata principles in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings. In considering the numerous grounds upon which
habeas corpus relief may lie, the court construed the habeas cor-
pus statute'6 as contemplating that a person convicted of a crime
shall have: 1) a fair trial, 2) an opportunity for appeal, and 3) one
omnibus post-conviction habeas corpus hearing to raise col-
lateral issues which have not been "fully and fairly litigated."'"
The opinion by Justice Neely specifically provides that when an
issue has been "fully and fairly litigated during the trial and a
record of the proceedings is available ... a court may apply
rules of res judicata. ,,'8 Losh does not provide a further
1 Id at 832-33.
14 I& at 333.
11 277 S.E.2d 606 (W. Va. 1981).
" W. VA. CODE §§ 53-4A-1 to 11 (Supp. 1981).
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definition or suggested test for what will constitute full and fair
litigation, but the habeas corpus statute provides for a petition
if and only if those issues to be raised in the petition "have not
been previously and finally adjudicated or waived in the pro-
ceedings which resulted in the conviction and sentence .... 19
Moreover, a previous and final adjudication occurs "only when
at some point in the proceedings which resulted in the convic-
tion and sentence ... there was a decision on the merits thereof
after a full and fair hearing thereon ... "I
The most informative, helpful features of Losh come in the
court's recognition of three narrow exceptions where subse-
quent habeas corpus relief may not be summarily denied21 and a
recommended check-list of issues which may be raised in sup-
port of habeas corpus relief.' These guidelines can be used by
counsel to fully inform the defendant and, in doing so, avoid the
most prevalent of the three narrow exceptions to summary denial
of subsequent successive petitions, ineffective assistance of
counsel. The court suggests that the trial judge may inquire on
the record whether counsel has discussed all the grounds which
might apply to the petitioner's case and that a form containing a
list of those grounds explicitly waived may be provided.23
In another case decided this year, the court dealt with two
of the remedies prescribed for use by aggrieved prisoners in
Harrah." The appellant in Mitchem v. Melton" challenged a
denial of class action standing in a purported civil rights action
brought in Kanawha County Circuit Court pursuant to federal
law. 8 The case turned on the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals' interpretation and classification of the action as a sec-
tion 1983 suit rather than a habeas corpus petition.' Mitchem
11 W. Va. Code § 53-4A-1(a) (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
20 I& § 53-4A-1-(b).
21 277 S.E.2d at 611. The exceptions include: 1) ineffective assistance of
counsel, 2) newly discovered evidence, and 3) favorable change in the law, which
may be applied retroactively. Id.
SId. The opinion here includes a 53-item list, admittedly over-inclusive, of
grounds which may be considered sufficient to support a petition.
Id. at 612.
21 See note 1 supra.
" 277 S.E.2d 895 (W. Va. 1981).
" Id at 896. The trial court perceived the action as a habeas corpus petition
rather than a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
17 Id. at 898.
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demonstrates the importance of strategic procedural considera-
tions in selecting the most favorable of the Harrah remedies.
Had the court agreed that the action constituted a habeas cor-
pus petition, the trial court's attendant denial of class action
standing would not have been an appealable order.28
The foregoing prisoner's rights cases follow a common pat-
tern: the court is continuing to broaden and extend its protec-
tion of rights and, accordingly, is being increasingly put upon to
prescribe conduct and monitor compliance to effectuate its ob-
jectives." The need for such extensive judicial involvement
might be an indication that the court is on an excursion into an
area of questionable judicial expertise." While such action can
easily be justified by the interest in protecting inmates' con-
stitutional rights"' (an indisputable premise), one might ask
whether such a summary conclusion has been preceded by a
thorough evaluation of the hazards of judicial intervention in
this area. At the very least, these considerations should serve as
a caution flag for the court.
I In the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23 (Class Actions) is
excluded from the enumeration of rules which apply to "Extraordinary
remedies". A habeas corpus petition is expressly classified as an extraordinary
remedy. W. VA. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(5). Since the denial of class action standing is a
discretionary ruling by the trial court and "the failure to permit maintenance of a
class action by the trial court can have as grave procedural consequences to the
parties who are denied class participation as if a final judgment has been
rendered against them on the merits", the Mitchem court held that such a denial
is an appealable order. 277 S.E.2d at 901.
1 E.g., the imposition of psychological testing of guards and mandatory
reductions in confinement in Harrah, 271 S.E.2d at 332-33; the extensive
guidelines and checklists provided in Losh, 277 S.E.2d at 611; and the provisions
for appeal of a denial of class action standing in Mitchem, 277 S.E.2d at 901.
30 See, e.g., the United States Supreme Court's limitations on judicial in-
tervention into prison administration practices, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1980), holding that
[t]he problems that arise in the day-to-day operation of a corrections
facility are not susceptible of easy solutions. Prison administrators
therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption
and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are need-
ed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institu-
tional security.
Id. at 457.
For an analysis of some of the problems involved in judicial intervention in
prison administration, see Note, Complex Enforcement: Unconstitutional Prison
Conditions, 94 HARv. L. REV. 626 (1981).
11 Harrah v. Leverette, 271 S.E.2d at 331.
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A recent decision by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals has further clouded the unsettled status of the double
jeopardy rule in West Virginia. State ex rel. Watson v. Ferguson1
comes on the heels of two recent decisions in the same area,
State ex re. Dowdy v. Robinson2 and State ex re. Johnson v.
Hamilton,-'both of which attempted to clarify and apply the rule.
The decision in Dowdy was based on the court's holding that a
defendant is entitled to assert a claim of double jeopardy under
the "same evidence" or the "same transaction" test and the test
which afforded the defendant the greater protection would be
applied.' In Johnson, the court reiterated the Dowdy holding,
but qualified its application by recognizing that although a
single trial could be required for multiple offenses arising from
the same transaction, separate punishments might, never-
theless, be imposed.' In light of Dowdy and Johnson, the deci-
sion in Watson offers little consistency in its treatment and ap-
plication of the double jeopardy rule.
In Watson, the defendant was convicted on one of four
charges of first degree murder, after the trial court refused a re-
quest for a unitary trial on all four charges. When the trial court
set the date for the second trial, the defendant sought a writ of
prohibition on the ground that double jeopardy barred a second
trial.8 The majority held that, 1) the Dowdy-Johnson joinder re-
quirement is a procedural rather than a constitutional rule,' 2)
the "same transaction" and "same evidence" alternatives are
still available to a defendants and 3) since swinging a metal bar
274 S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1980).
'275 S.E.2d 167 (W. Va. 1979).
266 S.E.2d 125 (W. Va. 1980).
257 S.E.2d at 170.
266 S.E.2d at 128. This protection against multiple trials is referred to as a
"joinder" requirement. Watson, 274 S.E.2d at 441, quoting State ex rel. Johnson
v. Hamilton, 266 S.E.2d 125 (W. Va. 1980).
274 S.E.2d at 441.
Id. at 444.
'Id. at 445. While the court acknowledged the Dowdy-Johnson formulation,
it qualified the usefulness of the alternative tests. Explaining the difficulty in ap-
plying the rule, the court said that Dowdy and Johnson "did not attempt to
answer [the double jeopardy] queston except in a most general way .. " The
court elaborated:
It is probably not possible to formulate any detailed test for deter-
mining what constitutes the same offense for double jeopardy purposes.
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four times is not the "same volitive act", each swing constitutes
a separate offense under the "same transaction" test.'
Except for the characterization of the joinder rule as pro-
cedural rather than constitutional, Watson makes no change in
the law. The court simply distinguished the facts of the case to
avoid double jeopardy under the Dowdy-Johnson test. This
strained application leaves a gaping hole in the protection set up
in Dowdy and'renders the Johnson joinder requirement virtual-
ly a matter of discretion (with little guidance) for the trial
courts. The question now becomes one of determining the status
of double jeopardy in light of Watson.
An interesting feature of the Watson case is the division of
the justices on the decision. Justice Neely had written the ma-
jority opinions in both Dowdy and Johnson. In Watson,
however, Justice Miller, who had dissented on the legal reason-
ing in Johnson, wrote the majority opinion and Justice Neely of-
fered a terse but enlightening opinion in dissent. Perhaps, as
Justice Neely suggests, Watson might best be discounted as a
misapplication of an otherwise acceptable rule." By taking this
approach, future decisions can be made, untrammeled by the in-
consistency of Watson. Whatever the reasons for the shifting
factions and perspectives, their presence will be noteworthy in
future double jeopardy cases. Given the continued unsettled
status of the rule, those cases should be forthcoming."
THE RETREAT RULE
The retreat rule, a long-recognized aspect of self-defense,
has been expanded and clarified in State v. W.J.B.' The case
came before the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals on an
appeal from an adjudication of delinquency by the trial court,
based on the finding that the juvenile had committed voluntary
Certainly courts and commentators are in disagreement not only as to
the exact formulation for such tests but also as to the basic policies
underlying the double jeopardy clause.
Id.
274 S.E.2d at 448.
10 Md at 449.
" For further discussion see Comment, State ex rel Watson v. Ferguson:
Double Jeopardy and the Same Transaction Test, 84 W. VA. L. Rsv. 443 (1981)
(this issue).
1 276 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1981).
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manslaughter. Challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, the
appellant argued that the state had not met its burden of proof
in rebutting his evidence that the killing was in self-defense.
The court, in an opinion by Justice Miller, agreed.'
The retreat rule is not a new concept in West Virginia; its
basic form had been recognized and adopted by the beginning of
this century.3 A general statement of the historically-recognized
rule was "that a person in his own home who is subject to an un-
lawful intrusion and placed in immediate danger of serious bodily
harm or death has no duty to retreat but may remain in place
and employ deadly force to defend himself."4 The facts in W.J.B.,
however, did not fit neatly into this statement of the rule. The
victim had directed threats and assaults toward the juvenile's
home and family rather than toward the juvenile himself.- The
issue was whether the individual seeking the protection of the
retreat rule must be in fear of personal serious bodily harm or
death before he may employ deadly force. The court had no trou-
ble extending the limits on the use of deadly force to include
situations where the occupant reasonably believes that the in-
truder is threatening imminent violence 6 to others.
Although earlier cases had recognized this wider latitude of
protection, the application had been inconsistent and vague.
Decisions appeared to turn on the court's view of the pro-
vocative nature of the victim's conduct rather than the state of
mind of the defendant.7 The situation in W.J.B. provided the
ideal factual pattern for a finding that the defendant had acted
reasonably; the provocation was clear and the juvenile had ob-
viously exercised restraint by attempting to avoid a confronta-
tion before employing deadly force.
The opinion lists three reasons for this change in the retreat
rule: 1) continued vitality of the ancient English rule that a
man's home is his castle, 2) the presumption that an intruder
would expect his unlawful entry to be met by force relative to
the nature of his contemplated act, and 3) the status of the "re-
SId. at 551.
See State v. Manns, 48 W. Va. 480, 37 S.E. 613 (1900).
' 276 S.E.2d at 553, citing State v. Preece, 116 W. Va. 176, 179 S.E. 524
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treat" rule as a mere extension of the concept of self-defense.
Society's interest in minimizing the use of deadly force, whether
by reasonable or unreasonable people, is apparently out-
weighed.'
Under W.J.B., reasonableness is to be measured "in the
light of the circumstances in which [the defendant] acted at the
time.. . ." Though not characterized as such by the court, this
hybrid objective-subjective standard is essentially the same test
prescribed in the Model Penal Code for determining culpability
or justification based on the defendant's state of mind." The
adoption of this standard is an apparent attempt to make the de-
termination more flexible. Whether that flexibility will have
counterproductive effects on efforts to balance the interests of
society as against the interests of those seeking safety in their
own home, remains to be seen.1 From the perspective of the po-
tential intruder or the newly-fortified occupant, the immediate
effect is obvious and perhaps, ominous.
VOM DIRE
A new and stronger requirement of essentially unrestricted
voir dire has been prescribed in State v. Peacher.1 The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered an appeal from a
homicide conviction, one of the grounds of which was the trial
court's refusal to grant a motion for a change of venue. The
court, in an opinion by Justice McHugh, found that the defen-
dant had been denied the requisite latitude in conducting voir
dire to allow him to show a "present hostile sentiment" to sup-
SId. at 556.
'Id., quoting State v. Reppert, 182 W. Va. 675, 691, 52 S.E.2d 820, 880 (1949).
10 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 8.04(21(c) (1962), which provides, in pertinent
part, that "a person employing protective force may estimate the necessity
thereof under the circumstances as he believes them to be when the force is used,
without retreating, surrendering possession, doing any other act which he has no
legal duty to do or abstaining from any lawful action." Id, (emphasis added).
11 Consider the inherent difficulty in subjectively assessing the defendant's
perception of the particular circumstances (presented perhaps in both friendly
and hostile testimony) and in determining whether his reaction to that perception
was reasonable. This academic blend of subjective and objective standards is a
concept which may defy application by those persons unfamiliar with its premise,
yet charged with its use.
' 280 S.E.2d 559 (W. Va. 1981).
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port a change of venue.2 More specifically, the court held that
"[w]here a trial court's restriction of the scope of voir dire
undermines the rights sought to be protected by the voir dire
process it will be held to be an abuse of discretion and reversible
error."' This holding is an extension of the protection which had
previously existed.
The court had previously held that "[i]t is reversible error
for the court to fail to discharge a juror who is obviously objec-
tionable."' Peacher, going further, requires the trial court to
leave the defendant unfettered in his attempt to ascertain that
the jury is free from bias or prejudice. Using a convincing syl-
logism, the court reasons that since a fair trial is a fundamental,
protected right requiring a fair and impartial jury, it naturally
follows that any process designed to protect that fundamental
right must be given full meaning and effect. To so limit the ques-
tioning of potential jurors as to infringe upon the defendant's
ability to protect his right to a fair trial is, therefore, enough to
constitute reversible error.'
Although the conviction in Peacher was overturned on just
the voir dire error, the opinion goes on to consider questions
raised on appeal which did not require a ruling but were found
to "merit discussion."6 The balance of the opinion may prove
valuable in its discussion of two important areas: 1) the pre-
judicial effect of security precautions taken at trial and 2) ap-
plication of the suppression sanction for evidence unlawfully or
unconstitutionally obtained. While these guidelines are prescrib-
ed in dicta, the court's extensive discussion entitles them to
greater weight.
INDICTMENTS
An important change in prosecutorial technical work has
been effected by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals'
recent decision in State v. Petry.' The issue before the court
2 Id. at 568, quoting State v. Siers, 103 W. Va. 30, 136 S.E. 503 (1927).
'Id. at 570.
State v. West, 157 W. Va. 209, 219, 200 S.E.2d 859, 866 (1973).
280 S.E.2d at 569-70.
SId. at 571.
1 273 S.E.2d 346 (W. Va. 1980).
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was whether the common-law requirement of specifically charg-
ing an accused as either a principal in the first degree or prin-
cipal in the second degree (recently applied in State v. Bennett),'
compelled an acquittal of the appellant for the incorrect designa-
tion in the indictment. The court ruled that an acquittal was re-
quired,' but seized the opportunity to make a change in the re-
quirement. Effective prospectively only, the court abolished the
technical distinction between principals in the first and second
degree. In an opinion by Chief Justice Neely, the court supported
its decision by pointing out that "such technical distinctions
serve no meaningful purpose to defendants and merely allow the
guilty to go free."'
The benefit to prosecutors and assistants is obvious; the in-
dictment drafting procedure is greatly simplified. If the proof
available at the indictment stage is inconclusive as to the
accused's role in the alleged crime, the prosecutor need not
decide between expending more time and effort to garner proof
or taking a chance on a faulty indictment. Now, a general indict-
ment as a principal in the first degree will suffice to sustain a
conviction for a criminal act in the role of perpetrator, aider and
abettor, or accessory before the fact.'
Recent decisions have liberalized the rules for discovery in
criminal cases in West Virginia. For example, the details of the
state's case outside the indictment may be discovered by apply-
ing for a bill of particulars.' This and other discovery methods
serve the purpose for which the technical distinction between
principals was intended. As Petry points out, this liberalization
relegated the distinction to an unpredictable loophole in the in-
dictment procedure through which many an underserving defen-
dant has managed to slip.' By closing the loophole, the court has
shown that its liberalization of the procedural rules is being ap-
plied with an interest in justice and fairness and that there is no
room for provisions that work to the contrary.
157 W. Va. 702, 203 S.E.2d 699 (1974).
273 S.E.2d at 347.
Id., citing State v. Fitch, 263 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1980).
Id at 352.
State ex rel. Whitman v. Fox, 236 S.E.2d 565 (W. Va. 1977). The bill of par-
ticulars provision is found in W. VA. CODE § 62-IB-1 (Supp. 1981).
1 273 S.E.2d at 348.
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In State v. Moore,' the traditional elements of the crime of
obtaining money or goods by false pretenses were expanded to
include a new crime-promissory fraud.
Although promises are not explicitly excluded from false
pretenses,2 the traditional view has been that the crime con-
templated only statements or representations pertaining to "ex-
isting facts or past events".' This majority rule has been sup-
ported by the argument
that to permit prosecutions for false promises to perform in the
future would encumber business affairs by subjecting debtors
to the threat of criminal penalties, allow disgruntled creditors
to retaliate with criminal prosecutions, and require the trier of
fact to look backwards from the failure to complete the perfor-
mance to ascertain intent.'
Notwithstanding these arguments for embracing the majority
rule, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals jumped ship,
following the lead of California. Quoting Justice Traynor in Peo-
ple v. Ashley,' the court was persuaded that "[p]ersons guilty of
nothing more than innocent breaches or ordinary defaults are
protected from criminal prosecution by the requirement that the
state prove beyond a reasonable doubt the fraudulent intent of
the defendant at the time the promise was made." This break
from the traditional view is justified as an effort to shield the
public "from the prospect of being unable to try and punish
those who practice fraud and deceit in an artful manner."7
In Moore, the court treated and disposed of only one of the
three reasons expressed in decisions embracing the traditional
view. Certainly, as Justice McGraw maintains, criminal burden-
of-proof requirements will protect the innocent from conviction.'
But the opinion in Moore, much like the progressive authorities
1 273 S.E.2d 821 (W. Va. 1980).
2 See W. VA. CODE § 61-3-24 (Supp. 1981).
273 S.E.2d at 824.
Id. at 824-25, citing Chaplin v. U.S., 157 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
42 Cal. 2d 246, 267 P.2d 271, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 900 (1954).
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it relies upon, does not adequately address the possibility of
disgruntled creditors bringing retaliatory charges or the in-
herent difficulty in looking backward to ascertain intent. Moore
only says that the trier of fact will be charged with the respon-
sibility of determining the existence of fraudulent intent, and
the innocent will thereby be protected.9
The court provides a questionable characterization of the in-
terests at stake. Apparently, the court believed that the public
would be protected from the artful con-artist at the minimal ex-
pense of a remote chance that a bungling debtor might be crim-
inally convicted." The test might be more appropriately char-
acterized as weighing the interest of society in deterring and
punishing those who would deal in bad faith (beyond the trad-
itional civil remedies) against the interest of those who may find
themselves subjected to criminal proceedings for an ordinary
breach or default on a promise, and relying on a trier of fact to
look backward and recognize a lack of fraudulent intent. Had the
court addressed all the arguments for retention of the tradi-
tional view, the new law might have been more difficult to
justify.
In any event, Moore is a new development which merits con-
tinued scrutiny. The case may have created a formidable legal
weapon and a new line of criminal litigation in an area previously
limited to civil remedies.
William Galeota
JUVENILE TRANSFER HEARINGS
Legislation concerning transfer of juvenile offenders to
adult criminal court has changed rapidly and substantially in the
last several years. The cases coming before the Supreme Court
during this survey period reflect these changes.
9 Id, quoting People v. Ashley, 42 Cal. 2d at 263, 267 P.2d at 282. This
discussion fails to address the detriment to a party in being forced to defend
against the criminal charges through the proceedings to that point where the
determination of guilt or innocence is made. The threat of criminal charges is, in
and of itself, sufficiently serious to be factored into the balancing of interests.
Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant in Moorelacked the requisite fraudulent
intent, his situation vividly demonstrates the burden of being forced to defend
against a criminal charge, regardless of the outcome.
1 273 S.E.2d at 825.
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In 1975, the transfer statute1 required circuit courts to hear
cases involving persons under 18 in a juvenile capacity, unless
the alleged crime was a capital offense. In Thomas v. Leverette,
Warden,2 Thomas was 16 years old when he was arrested for
armed robbery. He pleaded guilty to one count and was sentenced
to the State Penitentiary for 15 years. He received this sentence
because the circuit court had determined that Thomas was not
entitled to a transfer hearing; that he fell within the capital of-
fense exception to juvenile jurisdiction. The supreme court
reversed on the grounds that armed robbery is not a capital of-
fense' and, more significantly for later statutory developments,
that "due process requires that a juvenile be afforded a hearing
to determine whether he or she is statutorily excluded from the
juvenile jurisdiction of the circuit court."' The circuit court
could only remove the juvenile to the criminal division if pro-
bable cause existed to believe that the juvenile had committed
the alleged offense.
In 1977, an amended transfer statute' allowed the juvenile
court to waive its jurisdiction only upon presentation of clear
and convincing proof that: 1) there was probable cause to believe
that the juvenile had committed the offense and 2) that there
were no reasonable prospects for rehabilitation of the child. The
statute also provided that the testimony of a child at a transfer
hearing would not be admissible in a criminal proceeding or at
the adjudicatory hearing.' In State v. R.H., the defendant was
17 years old when he was charged with murder. While his transfer
petition was pending, the 1978 Amendments, which withdrew
some of the juvenile law's protections, went into effect. The cir-
cuit court determined that the 1978 law should apply, that pro-
W. VA. CODE § 49-5-3 (1975) provided in material part: "Except as to a viola-
tion of law which if committed by an adult would be a capital offense, the court
shall hear and determine criminal charges in the manner provided in [article 5 of
the juvenile laws]."
2 273 S.E.2d 364 (W. Va. 1980).
' The court held that the legislature did not intend to include armed robbery
as a capital offense since it did not specifically provide for a penalty of life im-
prisonment, but left this within the discretion of the trial court.
273 S.E.2d at 369.
W. VA. CODE § 49-5-10(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
W. VA. CODE § 49-5-10 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
7 273 S.E.2d 578 (W. Va. 1980).
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bable cause existed and that no reasonable prospects existed for
the rehabilitation of the child. R.H. was transferred to adult
criminal court. He appealed,' claiming that the 1978 amend-
ments were unconstitutional because they did not require the
court to make findings on the issue of reasonable prospects for
rehabilation, thereby denying the juvenile a meaningful hearing
on transfer. The defendant also claimed that the application of
the 1978 amendments to his transfer was, in effect, an ex post
facto law because he could no longer testify in his own behalf
without fear that the statement could be used against him in
subsequent proceedings.
The supreme court granted R.H. a new transfer hearing,
holding that the 1978 amendments should not have been applied,
because the deprivation of the chance to testify for himself was
a prejudicial denial of a substantial statutory right. Although
the 1978 amendments did not apply to this case, the court took
the opportunity to discuss their constitutionality. Although the
new statute eliminated the requirement for inquiry into pro-
spects for rehabilitation, the court believed that this does not
preclude consideration of the personal factors suggested by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Kent v. 'U.S.,9 and adopted by this state
in State ex reL Smith v. Scott."° The court held that the 1978
amendment included several of these factors1 as an absolute
minimum and that this, together with the court's earlier recogni-
tion of the other factors, establishes firm guidelines for a "mean-
ingful transfer hearing" as required by due process."2
The court reaffirmed its commitment to consideration of the
personal factors in State v. G. B. G. ,1 in which the trial court's
consideration of the juvenile's individual background was approv-
ed as being "the proper exercise of its sound judicial discretion.""
' W. VA. CODE § 49-5-10 (fM allows a juvenile to directly appeal a decision of
the circuit court to waive its juvenile jurisdiction.
383 U.S. 541 (1966).
o 238 S.E.2d 223 (1977).
,I The 1978 amendment requires consideration of the child's mental and
physical condition, maturity, emotional attitude, home or family environment,
school experience and similar factors.
12 The Kent criteria, adopted by the court in Smith included: seriousness of
the offense, element of violence, whether the offense was against persons or pro-
perty, the maliciousness or deliberateness of the act and previous acts of delin-
quency.
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Due process protections do not, however, include a jury trial
for the transfer hearing. In In Re: E. H.,15 the defendant raised
this issue of jury trials and the issue of the required standard of
proof of commission of the crime in appealing his transfer to
adult court on charges of kidnapping, armed robbery, and grand
larceny. The court refused to require a jury trial at the transfer
hearing, holding that the wording of the statute"6 and substan-
tial precedent'7 supported the conclusion that a jury is required
only at an adjudicatory hearing. The court also held that the
State must establish probable cause that the juvenile committed
the crime. General grounds for transfer must be proven with
clear and convincing evidence. A transfer hearing requires a
meaningful opportunity to be heard, to present witnesses and
evidence and to cross-examine; but the hearing need not con-
form to all of the formal requirements of a criminal trial. 8
While the court refused to extend extra protections to
juveniles by granting jury trials on transfer issues, it did grant
extraordinary protection regarding waiver of counsel. 9 Faced
with a statute expressly allowing "knowing waiver of counsel"2
in preliminary juvenile hearings, and also faced with transcripts
of hearings in which waivers were wholly inadequate, the court
in State ex rel, J. M. v. Taylor2 held that a juvenile cannot
waive his right to counsel except on the advice of counsel. The
court rejected a standard of review for waivers of counsel based
on an analysis of the "totality of circumstances" under which the
waiver was made.2 They also rejected a test which would in-
validate waivers secured without the presence of a guardian,
, 276 S.E.2d 657 (W. Va. 1981).
, W. VA. CODE § 49-5-6 and § 49-5-10.
17 The court specifically relied on the definition of a meaningful transfer
hearing as announced in State v. McArdle, 156 W. Va. 409, 194 S.E.2d 174 (1973)
and in Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541 (1966): neither included a right to a jury trial.
276 S.E.2d at 558.
" The waiver of counsel issue is not restricted to transfer hearings, but also
arises at probation revocation hearings and adjudicatory and preliminary delin-
quency hearings.
W . VA. CODE § 49-5-9 (a)(2).
" 276 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1981).
The "totality of circumstances" test involves a consideration of such fac-
tors as age, maturity, previous experience with police or courts, advice of parent
or counsel, methods of detention, education, knowledge of the charge and nature
of the right to be waived to determine whether the waiver was knowingly made.
See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
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parent or interested adult, because of the difficulties in est-
ablishing who is sufficiently interested." The more admirable
view, according to Chief Justice Harshbarger, is that a juvenile's
right to counsel is non-waivable' and this view is consistent
with other proceedings involving children in which the right to
counsel cannot be waived." But the legislature provided for the
waiver in juvenile criminal proceedings, and so the court went
as far as possible to protect juveniles: requiring that counsel be
present before counsel can be waived.
In the same case, the court held that admissions of guilt are
to be judged by the standards that validate an adult guilty plea:
an admission is invalid because unintelligently made when the
court fails to apprise the juvenile fully of the charges, the
penalties and the consequences of pleading guilty, including the
rights which would be waived by such a plea.
After all this expansion, definition and protection of juvenile
rights in transfer hearings, the court abruptly reversed itself in
State ex rel Cook v. Helms."6 The defendant, 17 years old, was
charged with cooperating with two adults in a shotgun murder.
A petition to waive juvenile jurisdiction was granted, after a
transfer hearing in which the juvenile court heard testimony
from probation officers, psychologists, and directors of youth
services agencies. The transfer order stated:
[The court finds that she has average intelligence, is competent
to stand trial in this matter, and has heard no evidence to in-
dicate to the court that if found guilty of the charge of murder
in this case, that she should be given any special treatment
simply because she was several months short of her eighteenth
birthdayYl
The trial court had also found probable cause to believe that the
defendant had committed the crime of murder.
0 For example, the parents of one of the juveniles involved in this case had
filed multiple petitions alleging delinquency against him.I This recommendation was made by the IJA/ABA Juvenile Justice Stan-
dards Project, Standards Relating to Adjudication, § 1.2 (1977).
' Some other proceedings cited in which a child may not waive counsel are:
civil suits where the minor is a plaintiff or defendant, eminent domain pro-
ceedings, will probate in solemn form, and neglect proceedings. 276 S.E.2d at 203.
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Helms appealed on the grounds that the court had failed to
make a finding that she was unsuitable for rehabilation within
the juvenile system.2 The supreme court held that when there
is probable cause that a juvenile has committed one of the
crimes specified in W. Va. Code § 49-5-10 (d)(1) (1978),2 a transfer
to adult court may be granted without further inquiry. This
holding overruled State v. R. H.1 (in Wvhich the court had
established the constitutionality of the 1978 amendments) and
State v. C. J. S.
The court based its decision on a re-examination of the
words of the statute, and of the changes made between 1977 and
" The defendant also appealed on the ground that the transfer hearing did
not take place within seven days of the filing of the transfer petition as required
by W. Va. Code § 49-5-10(a) (1978). The court held that the continuance allowed
reasonable notice to the child, parents and counsel, and had therefore been
granted for good cause.
W. VA. CODE § 49-5-10(d) provides:
The court may, upon consideration of the child's mental and
physical condition, maturity, emotional attitude, home or family en-
vironment, school experience and similar personal factors, transfer a
juvenile proceeding to criminal jurisdiction if there is a probable cause
to believe that:
(1) The child has committed the crime of treason ... ; the crime of
murder ... ; the crime of robbery involving the use or presenting of
firearms or other deadly weapons ... ; the crime of kidnapping...; the
crime of first degree arson ... ; sexual assault in the first degree ... ;
and in such case, the existence of such probable cause shall be sufficient
grounds for transfer without further inquiry; or
(2) A child has committed an offense of violence to the person which
would be felony [sic] if the child were an adult; Provided, that the child
has been previously adjudged delinquent for the commission of an of-
fense which would be a violent felony if the child were an adult; or
()A child has committed an offense which would be a felony if the child
were an adult: Provided, that the child has been twice previously ad-
judged delinquent for the commission of an offense which would be a
felony if the child were an adult; or
(4) A child, sixteen years of age or over, has commited an offense of
violence to the person which would be a felony if commited by an adult;
or
(5) A child, sixteen years of age or over, has committed an offense
which would be a felony if committed by an adult: Provided, that such
child has been previously adjudged delinquent for an offense which
would be a felony if the child were an adult.
273 S.E.2d 578 (W. Va. 1980).
8 263 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 1980).
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1978. Because subsection (d)(1)32 contained the phrase "without
further inquiry", unlike any other subsection of the transfer
statute, the court concluded "that the Legislature intended to
relieve courts from making any inquiry into the juvenile's per-
sonal factors when the court believes that the seriousness of the
crime alone warrants the child's being treated as an adult."3
Writing for the majority, Justice Neely explained that the Leg-
islature was eliminating the impossible burden of proof that had
previously been required of the state: "producing clear and con-
vincing proof there are no programs, facilities or institutions
available to the court which would offer reasonable prospects
for rehabilitating the juvenile. To prove this, the evidence must
show consideration has been given to every feasible alternative
to which the court could possibly refer the juvenile."'"
Elimination of this impossible burden, according to Justice
Neely, also insulated trial courts from a "subjective review
concerning whether there was sufficient evidence to support
their conclusion to transfer,"35 while leaving them with discre-
tion on whether to consider personal factors. The court com-
mended the juvenile judge for his thorough inquiry into Teressa
Helm's case.
It is unclear from the decision why the court took the
drastic step of eliminating mandatory consideration of personal
factors in a transfer hearing in this case: only the failure to
make a finding of suitability for rehabilition was at issue. It is
clear, however, that the court has redefined a "meaningful
transfer hearing" for a small group of juveniles.
For the juveniles whose crimes fit within § (d)(1) of the
transfer statute,38 the transfer hearing now becomes a probable
cause hearing. This altered approach, which covers an expanded
number of crimes, results in less protection than was afforded
by the 1975 statute.7 It is not at all clear, under a comparative
examination of the statutes, that this is what the Legislature in-
tended. The 1978 statute specifically provides that a court may
Text at supra note 29.
No. 92-81 at 5.
State v. M. M., 256 S.E.2d 549, 555 (W. Va. 1979).
No. 92-81 at 6.
Text at supra note 29.
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transfer, upon consideration of the child's mental and physical
condition, maturity, emotional attitude, home or family environ-
ment, school experience and similar personal factors, and if
there is probable cause. The statute further says that if there is
probable cause that the child has committed treason, murder,
armed robbery, kidnapping, arson or sexual assault, probable
cause is sufficient grounds for transfer without further inquiry.
If "without further inquiry" is intended to eliminate considera-
tion of the above factors, the court should at least require a
clearer statement of intent from the Legislature, or better yet,
should step in to protect individual rights from what may be a
public reaction to high crime rates.
Important rights are afforded to juveniles through the
juvenile system; e.g., right to treatment with goals of rehabilita-
tion and behavior modification rather than punishment, a right
to closed records,' a right to continuing disposition by the
court. 9 "The right to be treated as a juvenile is a substantial
right."40 It is extremely unlikely that the child's best interests
will be served by prosecution in adult court. The Helms decision
does not allow the juvenile a chance to show that his or her best
interests lie within the juvenile system, and does not require
the court to give reasons why it has waived its jurisdiction.
Thus, a child is deprived of substantial rights due to an irrebut-
table presumption that commission of any of the enumerated
crimes removes that child from the rehabilitative purposes of
the juvenile law.4
In overruling State v. R. H.,4 the court failed to discuss how
the analysis in that case of the constitutionality of the statute
was affected. The court in R. H. had concluded that "W. Va.
Code § 49-5-10 does not violate the due process provisions of our
state and federal constitutions because the juvenile court must
vindicate the standards set forth by the United States Supreme
3 Text at supra note 1.
See, e.g., Jeffrey v. McHugh, 273 S.E.2d 837 (W. Va. 1980).
See, e.g., State ex rel. Washington v. Taylor, 273 S.E.2d 84 (W. Va. 1980).
'O 256 S.E.2d 549.
" Amicus Brief of the Juvenile Justice Committee in Support of the Petition
for Rehearing at 2, State ex rel. Cook v. Helms, No. 92-81 (W. Va. July 7, 1981).
" 273 S.E.2d 578 (W. Va. 1980).
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Court.''3 Thus, if the statute was read together with the stan-
dards set forth in Kent v. U.S. and adopted by West Virginia in
State ex rel Smith v. Scott," due process requirements for a
"meaningful hearing" were satisfied. Under Helms, the
juveniles .whose crimes fit the § (d)(1) description are transferred
on the basis of probable cause, rather than on a consideration of
the child's amenability to juvenile jurisdiction. The purposes
and meaningfulness of the transfer hearing are thwarted, and due
process is not achieved. Further discussion of how the statute
comports with due process and equal protection is needed. 5
Admittedly, the court did not totally eliminate consideration
of the personal factors: the trial judge has total discretion as to
whether such evidence will be considered. He may hear the evid-
ence and not consider it, he may not hear it, he may hear it but
not decide on the record. Disparate treatment will result, and
the transfer will be unreviewable by the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals because there will be no standards by which to judge the
exercise of transfer power. Justice Neely recognized this when
he declared that "trial courts are now insulated from a sub-
jective review."'" Rather than granting such broad and arbitrary
power, the court could have established firmer guidelines to in-
sure that each trial court considers the best interests of the
child, the family and society, and that only extraordinary
juveniles in extraordinary factual situations are transferred to
adult courts."'"
MISCELLANEOUS JUVENILE ISSUES
In State ex rel. Washington v. Taylor,1 the court gave an ex-
Id. at 582.
" Discussed in note 12 supra.
See generally, Vitiello, Constitutional Safeguards for Juvenile Transfer
Procedure: The Ten Years Since Kent v. United States, 26 DEPAUL L. REV. 23
(1976).
" No. 92-81 at 6.
' Whitebread & Beatty, Transfer between Courts: Proposals of the
Juvenile Justice Standards Project, 63 VA. L. REv. 221, 222 (1977). The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals approvingly cited proposals of the IJAIABA
Juvenile Justice Standards Project in two cases in this survey period: State ex
rel. J. M. v. Taylor, 276 S.E.2d 199 (W. Va. 1981) and Jeffrey v. McHugh, 273
S.E.2d 837 (W. Va. 1980).
1 273 S.E.2d 84 (W. Va. 1980).
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pansive reading to W. VA. CODE § 49-5-13 (b)(5),2 which grants to
the director of industrial schools the discretion to discharge a
committed child and return him to the court for further disposi-
tion. To avoid being transferred to adult criminal court on
charges of conspiracy to commit armed robbery,3 Washington,
age 17, entered into a plea bargain: he would serve one year at
the industrial school, in return for being treated as a juvenile
delinquent. Washington completed the rehabilitative program at
the school before the end of the year and the director, in accord-
ance with his statutory duty, developed a home release plan and
requested the circuit court to accept Washington for further
disposition. The circuit court judge refused, deferring to the
prosecutor's recommendation that Washington finish out his
year.
The Supreme Court of Appeals found this to be a close case:
the best interests of the child had been served by allowing the
plea bargain in the first instance, but when a maximum degree
of improvement has been reached, the child's best interests lie
in being released from a therapeutic program. The specificity of
the Code4 and the purposes of the juvenile law tipped the
balance: "Since juvenile institutions are structured in such a
way that release is the primary reward for the inmates' [sic]
behavior modification, it is quite likely that a rule which would
permit courts to sentence children for a definite term would con-
found the rehabilitation and behavior modification program of
the institution."
'
This holding supports the statutory purposes of the juvenile
law: rehabilitation of the child and maintenance of the family.
W. VA. CODE § 49-5-13 (b)(5) (1980) provides:
Upon a finding that no less restrictive alternative would ac-
complish the requisite rehabilitation of the child, and upon an adjudica-
tion of delinquency pursuant to subdivision (1), section four, article one
of this chapter, commit the child to an industrial home or correctional
institution for children. Commitments shall not exceed the maximum
term for which an adult could have been sentenced for the same offense,
with discretion as to discharge to rest with the director of the institu-
tion, who may release the child and return him to the court for further
disposition.
An adjudication of delinquency replaced the transfer, in order to allow the
commitment to the Industrial School for Boys.
Text at note 2 supra.
273 S.E.2d at 86.
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Hopefully, it will not have a deleterious effect on prosectuors'
willingness to plea bargain, or on a juvenile court's refusal to
transfer the child to adult court.
The child's best interests were further protected in Jeffrey
v. McHugh," in which the court refused to allow disclosure to the
county prosecutor of the juvenile records of a 17 year old who
had hanged himself in the county jail. W. VA. CODE § 49-5-17 (d)7
allows opening of the records in only five enumerated excep-
tions, which do not include a prosecutor checking into cir-
cumstances of death. Although a constitutionally compelling
reason might have allowed the court to expand upon these ex-
ceptions, the court found no such reason in this case. M. D. J.'s
case ended upon his death, and there were no existing cir-
cumstances which could force the juvenile record open.
Joan Mooney
SPEEDY TRIAL
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the sixth
amendment1 and is applicable to the States by the fourteenth
amendment.' The Constitution of the State of West Virginia also
guarantees a speedy trial in art. III, § 14. The remedy for viola-
tion of the constitutinal right is dismissal of charges against the
273 S.E.2d 837 (W. Va. 1980).
The five enumerated exceptions in W. VA. CODE § 49-5-17(d) are:
(1) A court having juvenile jurisdiction has the child before it in a
juvenile proceeding;
(2) A court exercising criminal jurisdiction dver the child requests
such records for the purpose of a presentence report or other
dispositional proceeding;
(3) The child or counsel for the child requests disclosure or inspection
of such records;
(4) The officials of public institutions to which a child is committed re-
quire such records for transfer, parole, or discharge considerations;
or
(5) A person doing research requests disclosure, on the condition that
information which would identify the child or family involved in
the proceeding shall not be divulged.
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution reads in relevant
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial..."
2 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
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defendant; therefore, it has seldom been successfully asserted
on appeal of a conviction or in a writ of habeas corpus. Recently,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered two
West Virginia statutes which require the defendant to be tried
within a certain period of time. One statute was held to define
the "constitutional" right; another was held to create a
statutory right.
3
In State ex rel Shorter v. Hey,' relators were indicted dur-
ing the May, 1980, term of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County.
At a pre-trial hearing, the judge, on his own motion, continued
the case to the September, 1980, term of court. The judge's trial
docket was filled for the remainder of the May term. At the end
of that term he was going to attend a seminar and then take a
vacation.' The relators filed a petition asserting that their cases
were moved without good cause beyond the term of their indict-
ment. Accordingly, the relators, relying upon W. Va. Code § 62-3-1
and its interpretation in State ex rel Holstein v. Casey,' sought
to be discharged from further prosecution.' In Holstein, the
court said that a criminal defendant is denied his right to a
speedy trial if he is not tried within the term of his indictment
unless good cause is shown for continuance.' According to Hols-
tein, violation of W. Va. Code § 62-3-1 requires the dismissal of
charges against the defendant.' The Shorter case overrules the
Holstein interpretation of W. Va. Code § 62-3-1, then clarifies W.
Va. Code § 62-3-1 and distinguishes it from the other speedy trial
statute, W. Va. Code § 62-3-21.
The "one term rule," W. Va. Code § 62-3-1, provides that a
criminal defendant shall be tried in the same term of court in
which he was indicted, unless good cause exists for a contin-
uance to a later term." The "three term rule," W. Va. Code
State ex rel. Shorter v. Hey, No. 15068, slip op. at 8 (W. Va. Mar. 17, 1981).
[hereinafter cited as Shorter].
Shorter, No. 15068 (W. Va. Mar. 17, 1981).
8Id. at 2.
265 S.E.2d 530 (W. Va. 1980).
Shorter, No. 15068, slip op. at 3 (W. Va. Mar. 17, 1981).
265 S.E.2d at 530.
Id. at 533.
, W. VA. CODE, § 62-3-1, provides, in part, as follows: "When an indictment
is found in any county, against a person for a felony or misdemeanor, the accused,
if in custody, or if he appear in discharge of his recognizance, or voluntarily, shall,
unless good cause be shown for a continuance, be tried at the same term."
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§ 62-3-21, provides that, subject to enumerated exceptions, a
criminal defendant must be discharged from prosecution if not
tried within three regular terms of court after presentment on
indictment or appeal from an inferior tribunal."
According to Shorter, W. Va. Code § 62-3-1 does not define
the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial; rather, it
provides the defendant with a statutory right to be granted a
trial in the term of his indictment. 12 Therefore, because W. Va.
Code § 62-3-1 is a statutory right lacking a specific stated penalty,
it is not to be interpreted as requiring the extreme remedy of
dismissal of defendant's charges, but as providing the defendant
the right to compel a trial by mandamus." "[Ilt is W. Va. Code
§ 62-3-21, rather than W. Va. Code § 62-3-1, which is the
legislative adoption or declaration of what ordinarily constitutes
a speedy trial within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. VI and
W.Va. Const., art. III, § 14."14
According to Justice Thomas Miller, dissenting in Holstein,
"the two statutes were designed to complement each other.' 5
" W. VA. CODE, § 62-3-21, provides as follows:
Every person charged by presentment or indictment with a felony or
misdemeanor, and remanded to a court of competent jurisdiction for
trial, shall be forever discharged from prosecution for the offense, if
there be three regular terms of such court, after the presentment of
such court, after the presentment is made or the indictment is found
against him, without a trial, unless the failure to try him was caused by
his insanity; or by the witnesses for the State being enticed or kept
away, or prevented from attending by sickness or inevitable accident;
or by a continuance granted on the motion of the accused; or by reason
of his escaping from jail, or failing to appear according to his
recognizance, or of the inability of the jury to agree in their verdict; and
every person charged with a misdemeanor before a justice of the peace,
city police judge, or any other inferior tribunal, and who has therein
been found guilty and has appealed his conviction of guilt and sentence
to a court of record, shall be forever discharged from further prosecu-
tion for the offense set forth in the warrant against him, if after his hav-
ing appealed such conviction and sentence, there be three regular terms
of such court without a trial, unless the failure to try him was for one of
the causes hereinabove set forth relating to the proceedings on indict-
ment.
Shorter, No. 15068, slip op. at 8 (W. Va. Mar. 17, 1981).
" 265 S.E.2d at 536-37 (Miller, J., dissenting).
" Shorter, No. 15068, slip op. at 8 (W. Va. Mar. 17, 1981); State ex rel. Smith
v. Deberry, 146 W. Va. 534, 120 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1961).
5 265 S.E.2d at 535 (Miller, J., dissenting).
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W. Va. Code § 62-3-1 requires that a defendant is to be tried
within the indictment term unless good cause is shown for a con
tinuance. If good cause is shown for continuance, W. Va. Code
§ 62-3-21 provides a limit to the time trial may be delayed and
still meet the constitutional requirement regarding a speedy
trial.8
Shorter implies that "good cause" to continue a trial beyond
the term in which the indictment was issued is a broad concept
which a wide variety of circumstances may satisfy. Although the
standards for determining good cause are committed to the trial
judge's discretion, Shorter emphasizes the importance of stating
the reasons for which the continuance was granted in order to
make appellate review of the decision easier and more fair." In
determining what is good cause, judges are no longer required
to distinguish between single and multi-judge circuits. A trial
judge in a multi-judge circuit may consider a congested docket
as good cause for continuing a trial beyond the term of indict-
ment without having to inquire whether another judge in the
circuit can try the case within the indictment term."8 Further-
more, a continuance of trial beyond the indictment term may be
made on the court's own motion.'9
Although Shorter adopts a liberal interpretation of "good
cause," it does not support unnecessary delay of criminal trials.0
In fact, where the trial court believes "the State has deliberately
or oppressively sought to delay a trial beyond the term of indict-
ment, and such delay has resulted in substantial prejudice to the
accused, the trial court may, pursuant to W. Va. Code § 62-3-1,
finding that no good cause was shown to continue the trial,
dismiss the indictment with prejudice.""1
It was well recognized that dismissal of criminal charges is
an extreme remedy. Even in interpreting W. Va. Code § 62-3-21,
West Virginia has not followed a "restricted time view" '2 For
example, the term at which the indictment is returned is not to
1l Id.





265 S.E.2d at 536 (Miler, J., dissenting).
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be counted in favor of the defendant. 3 Also, any court terms
which pass while the defendant is without the jurisdiction of the
court are not to be counted as terms within W. Va. Code § 62-3-21. 21
Furthermore, "terms" in W. Va. Code § 62-3-21 has been inter-
preted to mean whole terms, not parts of a term. Even if the
defendant is brought into the jurisdiction of the court on the day
following the beginning of the term of court, the term in which
the defendant is returned is not to be counted in his favor.25
In State v. Young,2 a defendant was found guilty of
burglary after a twenty month delay between indictment and ar-
raignment. The defendant appealed his conviction, asserting
that he was not tried within the proper time after his indictment
pursuant to W. Va. Code § 62-3-21."
The "constitutional" rule provides that delay of trial is
justified if caused by the defendant's
insanity; or by the witnesses for the State being enticed or kept
away, or prevented from attending by sickness or inevitable ac-
cident; or by a continuance granted on the motion of the accus-
ed; or by reason of his escaping from jail, or failing to appear ac-
cording to his recognizance, or of the inability of the jury to
agree in their verdict .... 1
The prosecution was unable to justify the delay of trial by
application of any of the statutory exceptions. Furthermore, the
record indicated that except for the period of time between
January, 1977, and May, 1977, the defendant did nothing to
delay the trial.2
Although the defendant did not object to continuance of the
burglary trial to later terms, it is the affirmative duty of the
State to provide the accused with a speedy trial and the accused
is not prejudiced by omitting to demand a speedy trial."0 There-
fore, in order to give effect to the accused's constitutional right
State ex rel. Smith v. DeBerry, 146 W. Va. 534, 120 S.E.2d 504, 505 (1961).
Z Id. at 535, 120 S.E.2d at 505.
Id. at 538-39, 120 S.E.2d at 506-07.
280 S.E.2d 104 (W. Va. 1981).
Id. at 105.
W. VA. CODE § 62-3-21 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
280 S.E.2d at 107.
s Id. at 108; State ex reL Stines v. Locke, 220 S.E.2d 443, 446 (W. Va. 1975).
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to a speedy trial and the mandatory provision of W. Va. Code
§ 62-3-21, the court reversed the defendant's burglary convic-
tion.
31
In State v. Rhodes,32 the court applied one of the exceptions
of W. Va. Code § 62-3-21 in order to permit the delay of trial
after defendant's indictment. The defendant was indicted for
armed robbery in May, 1968. He then fled the State until Jan-
uary, 1971.1 At that time the court decided that there was ques-
tion as to the defendant's sanity.
The time between May, 1968, and January, 1971, when the
defendant was without the jurisdiction of the court, is not to be
counted in determining whether the defendant is entitled to dis-
charge from prosecution.3 5 Neither was the January term to be
counted because the defendant's insanity prevented the State
from trying him in this term. Insanity of the accused is one of
the specific exceptions under W. Va. Code § 62-3-21. After it was
determined that the accused had regained his sanity, the court
held that he was tried within three regular terms of court.1
State v. Young and State v. Rhodes seem to say that if the
State is able to point to one of the specific enumerated excep-
tions set forth in W. Va. Code § 62-3-21 to justify the delay of
trial, then the court will hold that the accused was granted a
speedy trial, regardless of the time span between indictment
and trial.
Nevertheless, W. Va. Code § 62-3-21 remains more protec-
tive of the defendant than the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The United States Supreme Court, rather
than applying a set time span, has adopted a balancing test in
which the following factors are considered in deciding the con-
stitutional right to a speedy trial: (1) the length of delay; (2) the
reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his right;
and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. 8 Unfortunately, legisla-
280 S.E.2d at 108.
274 S.E.2d 920 (W. Va. 1981).
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tion which attempts to adopt the speedy trial right by est-
ablishing a time limit fails to consider two things: (1) possible
delays caused by the State's good faith attempt to gather evid-
ence; and (2) the highly congested court dockets throughout the
State." The finality of the remedy of discharge and the
accompanying possibility of a dangerous criminal defendant go-
ing free without a determination as to his innocence should in-
cline courts to find a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial in
only the most certain cases.
One application of W. Va. Code § 62-3-21 is set forth in State
v. Foddrell.0 West Virginia uses the Supreme Court's balancing
test to determine whether to inquire further into the State's due
diligence in seeking defendant so as to provide him a speedy
trial."'
In Foddrell, the appellant was not brought to trial until
more than six years after he had been indicted, during which
time the defendant made no effort to hide from authorities."
The appellant alleged that the State had denied him his right to
a speedy trial pursuant to W. Va. Code § 62-3-21.11
W. Va. Code § 62-3-21 is interpreted as requiring the State
to exercise reasonable diligence in procuring the defendant for
trial, once the defendant's out-of-state location is known." If the
State fails to exercise reasonable diligence, the defendant may
count the terms in which the State was inactive in determining
whether he is entitled to be discharged from prosecution. 5
The statute clearly distinguishes between a defendant who
flees the State and one who remains available for trial. 6 Before
the accused can rely upon the provisions of W. Va. Code §
62-3-21 he must not have resisted the State's attempts to return
him for trial. 7
"9 C. Whitebread, Criminal Procedure, 481 (1980); Amsterdam, Speedy
Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 525, 527-28, 530-31 (1975).
4 269 S.E.2d 854 (W. Va. 1980).
11 Id. at 858.
42d.
, 269 S.E.2d at 857; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 14; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
" State ex rel. Boso v. Warmuth, 270 S.E.2d 631, 633 (1980).
Id.; See State ex rel. Stines v. Locke, 220 S.E.2d 443 (W. Va. 1975).
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In establishing terms to be counted in favor of the accused
under W. Va. Code § 62-3-21, West Virginia has adopted a balan-
cing test in which the conduct of both the prosecution and defen-
dant are weighed 8 The elapsed period of time determines
whether there is a necessity to inquire into the other factors. A
recent West Virginia case stated that a time span of 2-1/2 years
between indictment and trial was sufficient to warrant further
inquiry. 9 The court should assess such factors as "(1) the length
of the delay; (2) the reaons for the delay; (3) the defendant's
assertion of his rights; and (4) prejudice to the defendant."50
The court decided that further inquiry was required since
six years passed between Foddrell's indictment and trial. The
case was remanded to determine whether the State had provid-
ed the defendant a speedy trial."
In State ex rel. Rogers v. Casey, 2 the court emphasized that
the defendant's constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel is concurrent with the defendant's right to a speedy trial.
The relator was indicted during the January, 1979, term of
court. At the time he was confined at Huttonsville Correctional
Center. Near the end of the January, 1980, term of court, the
State scheduled the case for the following day. The next day
defendant's counsel stated that he was not given adequate time
to prepare because of the short notice of the trial date. The
defense did not, however, move for a continuance. The judge
upon his own motion continued the case to the next term of
court. The relator, relying on the "three term rule," W. Va. Code
§ 62-3-21, seeks discharge from further prosecution. 3
In Rogers the State argued that "trial" within the meaning
of W. Va. Code § 62-3-21 was provided and the case was con-
tinued solely because the defendant's attorney was not prepared
to represent the accused at trial.'
" 269 S.E.2d at 858.
"' State v. Cox, 253 S.E.2d 517, 519 (W. Va. 1979) (The court stated that "a
delay of approximately two and one-half years between indictment and trial clearly
warrants further inquiry.")
269 S.E.2d at 858; Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
5' 269 S.E.2d at 859.
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In accordance with art. III, section 14 of the West Virginia
Constitution, a criminal defendant "shall have the assistance of
counsel and a reasonable time to prepare for his defense."" The
State fails to provide the defendant his right to effective assist-
ance of counsel when counsel is denied sufficient time to ad-
equately prepare for trial
5
The interest of the State in providing the defendant his
right to a speedy trial cannot be allowed to abrogate the defen-
dant's concurrent right to effective assistance of counsel and a
fair trial.-" Clearly, there is a substantial relationship between
the time to prepare for criminal trial and the effective represen-
tation provided by defense. In West Virginia there is a constitu-
tional right to a continuance if the defendant is not provided a
reasonable time to prepare his defense. 8
Although there is no rule by which to determine what is a
"reasonable" time to prepare for trial, recent West Virginia
cases suggest that twenty-four hours is not enough time. 9 Re-
quiring counsel to prepare for a criminal trial in less than
twenty-four hours has the effect of denying the accused effec-
tive assistance of counsel."
In Rogers, the defendant's counsel was not provided suffi-
cient time to adequately prepare for defense. Therefore, the con-
tinuance of trial to a following term was "necessary to protect
the relator's right to effective assistance of counsel and a fair
trial."81 When the State is unable to justify its failure to try the
- Art. III, § 14, W. VA. CONST., reads in pertinent part:
In all such trials, the accused ... shall have the assistance of counsel,
and a reasonable time to prepare for his defense ... (Emphasis added.)
" State ex rel. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Eno, 135 W. Va. 473, 63
S.E.2d 845, 850 (1951).
'7 State v. Bush, 255 S.E.2d 539, 547 (W. Va. 1979).
Wilhelm v. Whyte, 239 S.E.2d 735, 740 (W. Va. 1977) (Based on W. VA.
CONST. art. III, § 14).
"' See State v. Bush, 255 S.E.2d 539, 544 (W. Va. 1979) (a weekend was insuf-
ficient time to prepare); Housden v. Leverette, 241 S.E.2d 810, 811 (W. Va. 1978)
(one day was insufficient time to prepare); State ex rel. West Virginia-Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. Eno, 135 W. Va. 423, 63 S.E.2d 845, 851 (1951) (one day was insufficient
time to prepare).
1 State ex rel. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Eno, 135 W. Va. 473, 63
S.E.2d 845, 851 (1951).
11 273 S.E.2d at 359.
[Vol. 84
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defendant within three terms by any of the exceptions set forth
in W. Va. Code § 62-3-21, the relator must be discharged from
prosecution.2
Sartin v. Bordenkircher63 addressed the issue of whether the
denial of effective assistance of counsel which prevented a timely
appeal would warrant an unconditional discharge.
The relator was confined in the penitentiary for a conviction
of the crime of second degree sexual assault. It was not disputed
in Sartin that the relator was twice denied his right to appeal."
The relator corresponded with the attorneys and judge, and the
court concluded that he had reason to believe that his appeal
was being prosecuted. 5 If a defendant fails to inform the court
of appointed counsel's inaction, then any delay will not be con-
sidered extraordinary dereliction on the part of the State. 6
In West Virginia, an indigent criminal defendant has the
right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 7 "[T]o deny
adequate review to the poor means that many of them may lose
their life, liberty, or property because of unjust convictions
which appellate courts would set aside."" When failure to pro-
secute a timely appeal has not resulted in actual injury, except
in the case of extraordinary dereliction, the court should not dis-
charge the defendant but take immediate steps to provide pro-
secution of an appeal. 9
Whether there have been facts constituting extraordinary
dereliction by the State sufficient to warrant unconditional
release depends upon the individual case."
Factors which are relevant include the following: the clarity and
"2 Id. at 360.
272 S.E.2d 243 (W. Va. 1980).
Id at 244.
Id. at 245.
6a Rhodes v. Leverette, 239 S.E.2d 136, 145 (W. Va. 1977).
W, V. VA. CONST. art. III, § 10; Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), suggests
in dicta that the primary constitutional ground for the right of an indigent defen-
dant to counsel on appeal is the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution.
Giffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
Johnson v. McKenzie, 235 S.E.2d 138, 139 (W. Va. 1977); Carter v.
Bordenkircher, 226 S.E.2d 711, 712-13 (W. Va. 1976).
0 Rhodes v. Leverette, 239 S.E.2d 136, 144 (W. Va. 1977).
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diligence with which the relator has moved to assert his right of
appeal; the length of time that has been served on the underly-
ing sentence measured against the time remaining to be served;
whether prior 'writs have been filed or granted involving the
right to appeal; and the related question of whether resentenc-
ing has occurred in order to extend the appeal period.7'
The facts in Sartin established extraordinary dereliction on the




Probation is a significant part of the criminal justice system,
and during the survey period the court considered several aspects
of probation. One such aspect is the revocation of probation,
whereby probation is revoked and the probationer returned to
prison.
Probation revocation may be reviewed either by direct appeal
or by a writ of habeas corpus to the Supreme Court of Appeals.'
The courtmay then determine whether the revocation was proper.
In State v. Ketchum,2 the probationer, Ketchum, contended
that the revocation of his probation was improper since it was
based on criminal charges that were subsequently dismissed by
the prosecuting attorney. Ketchum had been criminally charged
with passing two bad checks. Although the prosecuting attorney
ultimately decided to dismiss those charges, the State presented
evidence of the bad checks as a violation of probation at a re-
vocation proceeding.
In finding the revocation proper, the court held that
dismissal of criminal charges will not prevent the subsequent
use of those charges in a probation revocation proceeding.'
1 272 S.E.2d at 246; The rule of extraordinary dereliction was also applied in
Johnson v. McKenzie, 235 S.E.2d 138 (W. Va. 1977) to require an unconditional
discharge of relator.
State v. Ketchum, No. 14301 (W. Va. June 23, 1981), at 3.
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In support of its holding, the court cited Sigman v. Whyte,4 a
West Virginia case which addressed a related issue. In Sigman,
the court held that probation could be revoked based on the
defendant's committing a criminal offense even though a criminal
trial had not occurred. Thus, probation can be revoked without
an underlying criminal conviction.
Although this rule may seem harsh, the court's perception of
the probation system justifies the result. In a revocation pro-
ceeding a probationer is not determined guilty or innocent of a
criminal offense. Rather, the court determines whether the facts
indicate by a preponderance of the evidence that a criminal of-
fense has been committed. If so, the court concludes that the re-
habilitative and other purposes behind probation have failed and
probation is revoked.'
The court has previously held that a dismissal of criminal
charges does not operate as a bar to a new trial on the same
charges.6 Thus, if a dismissal does not prevent a reindictment on
the same charges, neither should it prevent the use of such
charges in a revocation proceeding. This seems justifiable in
that a probation revocation proceeding has fewer procedural
safeguards than a criminal trial, due to the probationer having
more limited rights than the unconvicted population at large.
The court commented in a footnote that probation should
not be revoked on a minor technical violation of probation.7 It
appears that only a factual determination of a criminal offense is
sufficient to revoke probation.
In Hughes v. Gwinn,8 the court discussed the fourth and
fifth amendment rights of a probationer.' The probationer in ques-
268 S.E.2d 603 (W. Va. 1980).
Ketchum, No. 14301 at 3.
State v. Cunningham, 236 S.E.2d 459, 462 (W. Va. 1977); State v. Crawford,
83 W. Va. 556, 560, 98 S.E. 615, 617 (1919).
7 Ketchum, No. 14301 at 7 n.6.
I No. 15060 (W. Va. March 17, 1981). Justice Neely wrote the Hughes opi-
nion, with Chief Justice Harshbarger and Justice Miller concurring, and Justice
McGraw dissenting. Justice McHugh did not participate in the decision. At the
time of publication, the concurring and dissenting opinions had not been filed.
I The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against
unreasonable searches and seizures; the Fifth Amendment provides for due pro-
cess of law and protection against self-incrimination.
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tion, Hughes, was charged with writing bad checks while on pro-
bation. In conversations with her probation officer, Hughes ad-
mitted writing the checks knowing that she had insufficient funds
to cover them. Additionally, the probation officer allegedly read
Hughes' mail which contained numerous notices from her bank.
The probation officer presented this information at the revoca-
tion proceeding and probation was revoked.
Hughes contended that her probation revocation was im-
proper because: (1) she was not provided counsel during conver-
sations with her probation officer; (2) the evidence of her admis-
sions was obtained in violation of the Miranda rule; and (3) the
opening of her mail constituted an illegal seizure.
The court denied Hughes' contentions by emphasizing the
limited rights of a probationer, saying that probationers do not
have the same rights enjoyed by defendants before conviction.,
In West Virginia a probationer is provided with counsel at
both preliminary and final probation revocation hearings." How-
ever, this right to counsel does not extend beyond the pro-
ceeding, for the court believes that interposition of counsel
could ruin the relationship between probationer and probation
officer.12 Similarly, if the probationer were entitled to a Miranda
warning upon every meeting with the probation officer, the rela-
tionship would be strained."
Beyond the concern for a good working relationship is the
realization that the probationer has waived certain constitu-
tional rights in return for continued liberty. Acceptance of pro-
bationary status infers acceptance of the probation officer in
place of counsel in many respects.'
Although a probationer is protected from unreasonable sear-
ches and seizures, her status as a probationer is a significant fac-
tor in determining probable cause to search and seize." For the
" Hughes, No. 15060 at 2.
" See Louk v. Haynes, 223 S.E.2d 780, 787 (W. Va. 1976), where the court
held that counsel is required at each hearing at which the terms of probation are
modified.
II Hughes, No. 15060 at 5.
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protection of the probationer, however, not all evidence allowed
at a probation revocation hearing is admissible in a subsequent
criminal prosecution. Furthermore, evidence must be suppressed
in a revocation hearing if there is evidence of police
harassment. 6 Despite these protections, the probationer has
clearly waived certain constitutional rights for the benefit of
probation.
In State v. Cooper," the probationer, Cooper, was charged
with possessing and delivering marijuana in violation of proba-
tion. The state failed to present evidence of the marijuana trans-
action at the preliminary revocation proceeding, but was subse-
quently allowed to present the evidence at the final hearing.
Probation was revoked and Cooper argued that evidence of the
marijuana charge should not have been permitted in the final pro-
ceeding. The court disagreed with Cooper for the following
reasons:
First, the initial probation revocation notice contained the
marijuana charge, properly notifying the probationer.
Second, the state was unable to deal with the charge at the
preliminary revocation hearing because the marijuana had not yet
been tested at the State Police Laboratory. Thus, the state had
a bona fide explanation for its actions.
Third, there were other charges presented at the pre-
liminary hearing which warranted detaining the probationer for
a full hearing, lessening the necessity of presenting the mari-
juana charge at the preliminary proceeding. Likewise, if proba-
tion were revoked on one valid charge, the fact that other charges
proved to be invalid would not prevent upholding the revocation.
Fourth, the state filed a disclosure prior to the final revoca-
tion hearing which supplied the probationer with the marijuana
charge.18
By sanctioning the state's actions in Cooper, the court did
not intend to approve such procedure in all cases. 19 It appears
that the state's bona fide actions and written disclosure state-
ment were influential in the court's decision.
16 Id. at 10-11.
7 280 S.E.2d 95 (W. Va. 1981).
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In Spencer v. Whyte,' the court concluded that a circuit
judge is not empowered to order a period of incarceration as a
condition of probation.
Spencer was indicted for robbery by violence and conspiracy
to commit robbery. The trial court approved a plea bargain
agreement with Spencer. Under the terms of the agreement,
Spencer's sentence was suspended and he was placed on proba-
tion. As a condition of probation, Spencer served one year in the
county jail and began serving a one-to-five year sentence in the
state penitentiary. Thereafter, Spencer contended in a habeas
corpus writ that he had been illegally detained. The court
agreed with Spencer, recognizing probation as a system for
release and not for confinement."1
CRIMINAL SENTENCING
Proportionality of Sentences
The concept of proportionality prohibits a court from impos-
ing a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the severity of
a crime. Proportionality is an outgrowth of the Eighth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.' While the eighth
amendment does not contain an explicit statement of the propor-
tionality principle, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
principle is implicit in its prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.2
Article III, Section 5 of the West Virginia Constitution con-
tains the cruel and unusual punishment counterpart to the
eighth amendment. In addition, it contains an express propor-
tionality principle: "Penalties shall be proportioned to the char-
acter and degree of the offence." Thus, by means of the constitu-
0 280 S.E.2d 591 (W. Va. 1981).
21 Id. at 594.
1 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
2 Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). In Rummel, the Court recognized
that the eighth amendment does contain a proportionality element; however, the
Court refused to apply it in this case because the proportionality principle had
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tion an individual sentence can be struck down as disproportion-
ate.3
In State v. Houston,' the defendants argued that their sen-
tences of thirty years and forty years were disproportionate to
their crime of robbery by violence, and therefore unconstitu-
tional.
Both of the defendants were convicted of robbing a home-
owner at pistol-point. The statutory sentence for robbery by
violence, with a firearm, provides that upon conviction a defend-
ant "shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than ten
years."' The statute contains no maximum limit of punishment
and is consequently referred to as an open-ended sentencing
statute.
Defendants sentenced under this open-ended sentencing
statute may challenge the length of their sentences by a timely
motion to the trial court.' If the sentencing judge does not re-
duce the previously imposed sentence, then the defendants may
appeal to a higher court. Both of the defendants in Houston ap-
pealed to the supreme court.
When the Houston court began to review the lower court's
sentence, it found the record inadequate because it did not ex-
plain why each defendant received his particular sentence.
The supreme court ordered that an appropriate record be
made in all future cases where a sentence for robbery by vio-
lence is handed down. The court specified certain items that
must be included in the record:
The sentencing record should include the pre-sentence
report and any other diagnostic reports used as and aid in im-
posing the sentence. The court shall also permit statements
relevant to the sentence to be made on the record by the defen-
dant, his attorney, and the prosecuting attorney .... Where
sentence is pronounced on a guilty plea, the transcript of the
guilty plea shall also be included. Finally, the sentencing judge
State v. Houston, 273 S.E.2d 375, 377 (W. Va. 1980).
273 S.E.2d 375 (W. Va. 1980).
W. VA. CODE § 61-2-12 (1977 Replacement Vol.).
6 273 S.E.2d at 379.
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shall state on the record his reasons for selecting the particular
sentence .. . 7
The case was remanded to the trial court to permit a sentenc-
ing record to be developed.
The court dealt with similar contentions in Smoot v. McKen-
zie.' The appellant, Smoot, was sentenced to forty years in the
state penitentiary for armed robbery, while three co-defendants
received lesser terms. Smoot alleged that the forty year sentence
was unconstitutionally disproportionate to the sentences impos-
ed upon his co-defendants.
The court found it "impossible to say from the transcript of
the appellant's trial what factors the trial court considered in
sentencing the appellant."9 Therefore, the court reversed the
judgment of the lower court and remanded the case for develop-
ment of a record in light of Houston.
In Smoot, the court recognized an additional factor to be
considered in the appellate review of criminal sentences: whether
co-defendants who are similarly situated have received grossly
disparate sentences.
Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher0 indicates the importance of
proportionality standards to life sentences imposed under ha-
bitual criminal statutes.
Wanstreet was indicted in 1951 for forging a check in the
amount of $18.62. While on probation in 1955, he was found guilty
of arson for burning a hay barn and sentenced to the peniten-
tiary. Out on parole in 1963, he was found guilty of driving a
motor vehicle without a license and his parole was revoked. While
on parole in 1967, he was found guilty of forging a $43.00 check
and was then given a recidivist life sentence under § 61-11-18 of
the West Virginia Code.1
On appeal, Wanstreet contended that the life sentence he
7id
277 S.E.2d 624 (W. Va. 1981).
'Id at 625.
10 276 S.E.2d 205 (W. Va. 1981).
l W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1977 Replacement Vol.). "When it is determined ...
that such person shall have been twice before convicted in the United States of a
crime shall be sentenced to be confined in the penitentiary for life." Id
[Vol. 84
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received was disproportionate to the felonies he had committed.
The supreme court agreed and Wanstreet was discharged from
further confinement.
In its opinion, the court established more definite propor-
tionality standards for use in review of a life recidivist sentence.
These standards focus primarily on the nature of the offenses
committed. The controlling standard is whether the felonies
created a threat of potential or actual violence. Violent crimes
have traditionally carried more serious penalities. Thus, if one
or more of the offenses were violent, the life sentence would ap-
pear to be justified. 2
By considering the nature of the offenses, the court can be
discretionary in issuing a life recidivist sentence. This seems to
be the most fair and just method of approaching the possibility
of sentencing someone to the penitentiary for life. However, it
may be argued that the habitual criminal statute is mandatory
and precludes discretion by the court, because the statute pro-
vides that anyone convicted of three felonies shall be confined in
the penitentiary for life.
The court responded to this argument, saying that the
underlying purpose of the statute is to confine the dangerous
criminal who repeatedly commits serious crimes.13 The imposi-
tion of a mandatory life sentence for the felony of forgery goes
beyond this purpose and creates a disproportionate sentence.
Furthermore, such a reading of the statute ignores the principle
that penalties should be set according to the severity of the of-
fense.14
The court cited Hart v. Coiner"5 in support of its decision.
The court places special emphasis on Hart's four-factor test
which analyzes: "(1) [t]he nature of the offense; (2) the legislative
purpose behind the punishment; (3) a comparison of the punish-
ment with what would be inflicted in other jurisdictions; and (4)
,2 276 S.E.2d at 214.
" Id. at 211.
" Id at 214.
II 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973). Hart involved a West Virginia life recidivist
who had prior convictions for three non-violent offenses. The court of appeals
held the life sentence to be disproportionate under the eighth amendment.
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a comparison of punishment with other related offenses within
the same jurisdicition."'6
Theoretically, the proportionality principle applies to any
criminal sentence. However, proportionality standards are basic-
ally applicable to those sentences imposed under an open-ended
statute; or a habitual criminal statute, due to the higher risk of
disproportionate sentences in those two areas."
" 276 S.E.2d at 210.
" I- at 211.
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The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals dealt with tor-
tious communications and libel, and questions of first amend-
ment rights in Webb v. Fury.1
In Webb, the petitioners included Rick Webb, Braxton Envi-
ronmental Action Programs, Inc., and Mountain Stream Moni-
tors. Webb served as principal managing agent of the Braxton
corporation, and was an active directing member of the Moun-
tain Stream association. Both the corporation and the associa-
tion were concerned with coal mining and development in West
Virginia. The respondent, DLM Coal Corporation, was engaged
in coal mining in West Virginia.
The controversy between petitioners and respondent arose
after Webb communicated with different federal agencies con-
cerning DLM practices. These communications included an ad-
ministrative complaint lodged with the Office of Surface Mining
(OSM), and a request for an evidentiary hearing before the
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Webb,
either acting as an individual or on behalf of the corporation or
association, asserted that DLM was in violation of the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act, and the Clear Water Act.
In addition, Mountain Stream Monitors published a newslet-
ter which referred to DLM in an editorial about responsible coal
development. Although DLM was not specifically mentioned, the
editorial article and corresponding maps allowed for easy recog-
nition of DLM.
DLM filed a defamation action against the petitioners. The
petitioners sought to prohibit the circuit court from proceeding
with this defamation action. The petitioners based their' argu-
ment on constitutional grounds, and in particular, on the con-
stitutional guarantee of the right to petition. This right to peti-
tion the government for a redress of grievances is embodied in
No. 14975 (W. Va. July 13, 1981).
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the First Amendment to the United States Constitution2 and in
Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution of West Virginia.3
The petitioners asserted that their activities (the newsletter
and the communications) were petitioning activities, and there-
fore absolutely privileged. Furthermore, it was contended that
the mere pendency of the defamation action threatened the peti-
tioners' free exercise of their right to petition the government.
The court found merit in the petitioners' constitutional
arguments, and accordingly awarded them a prohibition against
the respondent's defamation action. The court made the follow-
ing conclusions:
First, everyone has a clear constitutional right to petition
the government. If someone chooses to exercise that right, any
resulting lawsuit based on those activities will be barred.4
Second, in petitioning the government, an attempt to influ-
ence public sentiment concerning the passage and enforcement
of laws is acceptable.'
Third, people have the right to inform government represen-
tatives of their desires by petition, regardless of their intent in
doing so. Thus, even if the intent behind a petition is malicious,
the petition is considered to be privileged and will not give rise
to a cause of action. This is reasonable since there is no way of
determining intent without first infringing upon someone's right
to petition.'
Fourth, a cause of action may arise if one party's conduct
prevents another party from participating in the policy-making
functions of government. This type of conduct is not considered
petitioning activity and is not protected under the right to peti-
tion.'
I "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Const. amend. I.
' "The right of the people to assembly in a peaceable manner, to consult for
the common good, to instruct their representatives, or to apply for redress of
grievance, shall be held inviolate." W. Va. Const. art. 3, § 16.
Webb, No. 14975 at 19.
Id. at 30.
'Id. at 25.
7 Id. at 21.
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These legal principles support a democratic society where
people can express their will and freely exchange ideas. The
court's decision to prohibit the defamation action is a clear pro-
tection of constitutional rights, and in the long run, a protection
of the democratic system.
Another case dealing with defamation issues was Mauck v.
Martinsburg.' Mauck discussed insulting words and analyzed
the insulting words statute, § 55-7-2 of the West Virginia Code9
Mauck was cashier for the City of Martinsburg during a
period of time in which $10,000 was embezzled from city funds.
A local jury determined Mauck not guilty of embezzling the
missing funds. However, Mauck was dismissed from her job as
cashier by the city manager, Dunworth. Mauck received a letter
from Dunworth which asserted, '(1) An embezzlement of some
$10,000 occurred while you were city cashier. This indicates, at
the least, incompetence and inefficiency in the performance of
your duties. (2) You have demonstrated carelessness and negli-
gence in the use of property of the city."' Dunworth sent a copy
of his letter to the members of the City Council and the City At-
torney, in accordance with the City of Martinsburg's Personnel
Rules and Policies.
Thereafter, Mauck brought suit against Dunworth and the
City of Martinsburg. She alleged both breach of her employment
contract and insulting words under § 55-7-2. In Mauck, the
supreme court dealt with the issue of insulting words.
The insulting words statute creates a cause of action
separate and distinct from traditional libel and slander actions.
The statute differs from the common law of libel and slander in
two ways: (1) lack of a publication requirement; and (2) giving a
cause of action for insulting words which tend to violence and a
breach of the peace. In all other respects they are the same.'
The court then discussed the common law defense of
qualified privilege, and its use in defamation cases. "A qualified
privilege exists when a person publishes a statement in good
280 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1981).
W. Va. Code § 55-7-2 (1981 Replacement Vol.). "All words which, from their
usual construction and common acceptation, are construed as insults and tend to
violence and breach of the peace, shall be actionable." Id.
10 280 S.E.2d at 218.
'1 Id. at 220.
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faith about a subject in which he has an interest or duty and
limits the publication of the statement to those persons who
have a legitimate interest in the subject matter." 2
The court concluded that Dunworth's letter to Mauck was
protected by a qualified privilege since Dunworth had acted in
strict accordance with the rules and procedures of the City of
Martinsburg. Dunworth had also acted in compliance with his
duties as city manager.
The court questioned whether Dunworth had abused his
qualified privilege, either by over-publicizing the letter or by
acting out of malice. Finding no evidence of abuse, the court af-
firmed the judgment for Dunworth.
WRONGFUL DEATH
The court addressed the issue of what damages may be
recovered in an action for wrongful death in Bond v. Hunting-
ton.' In its opinion, the court traced the history of West
Virginia's Wrongful Death Act,2 and noted the change in the
amount of recovery possible under the statute over the years.
The statute has been amended several times. The most re-
cent amendment occurred in 1976 and brought about significant
changes. First, the statute was substantially broadened to
remove the maximum limit on the amount of recovery. Second,
the elements of recoverable damages were expanded. Third, the
dependent distributee limitation was largely removed in certain
family relationships. Thus, damages can be distributed to family
relations without a showing of dependency upon the decedent.'
The 1976 act is very liberal in its scope. However, the
wrongful death action in Bond was brought prior to the 1976
12 Id. at 221.
276 S.E.2d 539 (W. Va. 1981).
2 West Virginia's Wrongful Death Act actually consists of three statutes: W.
VA. CODE § 55-7-5 (creation of the cause of action); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-6 (damages
that are recoverable); and W. VA. CODE § 55-7-7 (how such claim may be compris-
ed). Bond, 276 S.E.2d at 539 n.1. Section 55-7-6, concerning damages, is the
primary statute referred to in Bond.
276 S.E.2d at 541.
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amendment, and thus, fell under the terms of the 1965 Wrongful
Death Act.4
The facts of the case show that Cheryl Bond, age eighteen,
was killed in an automobile collision in 1975. While driving
through an intersection, Cheryl was struck and killed by a City
of Huntington police car driven by a city patrolman. Her parents
brought a wrongful death action under the 1965 Act against the
patrolman and the City of Huntington. They attempted to col-
lect general damages, punitive damages, and funeral expenses,
and recover for pecuniary loss. However, the trial court ruled
that they were only entitled to $10,000 in general damages plus
funeral expenses. "Recovery for loss of services, punitive
damages, and prejudgment interest was not allowed." 5 Cheryl's
parents appealed to the supreme court.
In Bond, the court approached each possible recovery
separately. First, it dealt with recovery for pecuniary loss.
Under the 1965 Wrongful Death Act, the maximum amount of
recovery for pecuniary loss was $100,000. Furthermore,
recovery itself turned on the question of whether or not the dis-
tributee was dependent upon the decedent. At the time of the
accident, Cheryl Bond was employed and living with her
parents. Thus, she did have some type of income, even though
she did not directly support her parents.
The court held that a showing of either legal or factual
dependency at the time of death would allow recovery for
pecuniary loss. "[Flactual dependency can be shown by evidence
that the deceased rendered services for which a monetary value
can be estimated."' Therefore, Cheryl's services to her parents
would allow them to recover for pecuniary loss.
The court also held that punitive damages may be
recovered, when the facts of the case warrant their award. In
other words, if death resulted from the malicious, reckless or in-
tentional act of the defendant, then punitive damages are allow-
ed.'
W. VA. CODE. § 55-7-6 (1965(amended 1976).
5 276 S.E.2d at 540.
Id. at 544.
T Id. at 545.
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Next, the court considered the recovery of prejudgment in-
terest. This type of recovery permits the injured party to collect
interest on any of his own money that was spent prior to trial.
This would include money spent on expenses such as hospital
and medical bills, or any other expense that could reasonably be
calculated. The purpose of awarding interest is to compensate
the injured party for the loss of the use of his own money.'
The court decided to adopt a rule that permits recovery of
prejudgment interest on pecuniary losses incurred prior to trial.
This is important to note since it represents a new element of
damages in tort actions. The rule allows recovery of interest
from the date the expense was incurred up to the date of the
trial. However, interest will not be allowed on future pecuniary
losses nor on any punitive damages that might be awarded. Addi-
tionally, the court concluded that full retroactivity should be
given the new prejudgment interest rule.9
The Bond opinion is important for two reasons. First, it
establishes guidelines for what can and can not be recovered in
a wrongful death action. In addition, the new prejudgment inter-
est ruling may give defendants an incentive to cooperate in get-
ting the case to court or in achieving a settlement. Failure to
cooperate could delay the trial, resulting in higher costs to the
defendant.
LAST CLEAR CHANCE
Ratliff v. Yokum1 is a noteworthy tort case because of the
court's decision to abolish the doctrine of last clear chance. The
last clear chance doctrine is primarily used by a plaintiff to
recover damages from a defendant, in spite of the plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence. The necessary elements of the doctrine
are: (1) the plaintiff placed himself in immediate peril; (2) the
plaintiff was unable to remove himself from the peril; (3) the de-
fendant discovered or should have discovered the dangerous
situation; (4) the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care to
prevent the accident; and (5) the defendant had the last clear
chance to prevent the accident.
' Id. at 547.
Id. at 549.
1 280 S.E.2d 584 (W. Va. 1981).
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The original purpose of the doctrine was to modify the
harshness of the contributory negligence rule. In other words, it
was meant to moderate the plaintiffs contributory negligence.
For this reason, most courts refused to extend the doctrine to
the defendant's negligence.
The lawsuit in Ratliff arose out of a motor vehicle accident.
At the trial court level, the defendant was allowed to utilize the
last clear chance doctrine to insulate his negligence, and the
plaintiff objected. On appeal, the supreme court agreed with the
plaintiff and went on to abolish the doctrine altogether. The
court held that the historical reasons supporting the doctrine no
longer existed in West Virginia, since West Virginia adheres to
a comparative negligence rule rather than one of contributory
negligence. In addition, the court noted the confusion often sur-
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
PARTITION OF REALTY
In Stillings v. Stillings,1 the court held that a divorce decree
award of exclusive possession of realty does not create a com-
mon law property interest in the party receiving such an award.
Therefore, a petition for partition of such realty is not automa-
tically defeated by a showing of decreed exclusive possession.
Mrs. Stillings had been awarded exclusive possession and
use of the jointly owned realty in question by divorce decree.
Mr. Stillings petitioned to have this realty partitioned by sale2
in a subsequent action. The partition action was dismissed by
the circuit court upon the finding that the award of exclusive
use and possession of the realty deprived Mr. Stillings of the re-
quisite possessory interest to bring the partition action. Mr.
Stillings appealed from this order.3
The Supreme Court of Appeals rejected Mr. Stillings' con-
tention that the right to partition by sale is absolute and, in-
stead, indicated that the party desiring such partition must
demonstrate that partition in kind is not convenient, that the in-
terests of one of the parties will be furthered by the sale, and
that the interests of the other parties will not be prejudiced by
such sale.' The court also rejected Mrs. Stilling's contention that
an award of exclusive possession alone denies a nonpossession
party the requisite possessory interest needed to bring a parti-
tion action. By analyzing West Virginia precedent on partition,'
the court indicated that only a present right of possession is ne-
cessary to entitle a party to a partition by sale if the above-
mentioned standards are met. The court refused to recognize
any common law property interest created by an exclusive pos-
session award, the rationale being that such an interest would
280 S.E.2d 689 (W. Va. 1981).
2 W. VA. CODE § 37-4-3 (1980 Replacement Vol.).
280 S.E.2d at 690.
Id. at 690, citing Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v. Riley, 247 S.E.2d 712
(1978), and its analysis of the requirements for partition by sale under W. VA.
CODE § 374-3.
5 280 S.E.2d at 691 citing Woodrum v. Price, 100 W. Va. 639, 131 S.E. 550
(1926); Brown v. Brown, 67 W. Va. 251, 67 S.E. 596 (1910).
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allow the awarded party to defeat the purpose of such posses-
sion by renting the property.'
The court thus found that partition by sale of jointly owned
realty is available as a modification to divorce decrees awarding
exclusive possession of one of the spouses and, therfore, revers-
ed and remanded. However, Justice Neely's concurrence again
indicated that this holding does not state that the right to parti-
tion by sale is absolute in the instant situation. Such possession
by the woman provides her with a degree of security that the
ex-husband will not leave the jurisdiction, making other aspects
of their divorce decree more easily enforceable. Neely therefore
sets out factors to be considered in such a partition request
bearing on the risk of loss of all support if the partition is
granted. These include past reliability of the husband in making
timely, undisputed payments, his general solvency, and the risk
of his departure upon partition.7
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
In Patterson v. Patterson,1 the court ruled that jurisdic-
tional limitations preventing circuit courts from joining divorce
actions and actions involving equitable claims in realty titled to
one spouse are no longer valid, and, therefore, such actions may
be joined. Also, the court set out guidelines for the imposition of
constructive trusts on realty in the limited situation where title
is solely in one spouse and other spouse has contributed separ-
ate funds or direct business services to the acquisition thereof.
It should be noted that the court's decision on the joinder
issue does not convert West Virginia into a community property
state. The general law in West Virginia continues to disallow
realty conveyances .in lieu of or in addition to alimony and child
support.2 In the constructive trust context, a spouse's contribu-
tion in the form of domestic services will not support the imposi-
6 280 S.E.2d at 692. The purpose of such an award of possession of property
is to allow its use by spouse and children as a living situs.
Id. at 692-93.
277 S.E.2d 709 (W. Va. 1981). For further discussion, see Comment, Proper-
ty Settlements in Divorce Proceedings: Patterson v. Patterson, 84 W. VA. L.
Buv. 457 (1981) (this issue).
I Id. at 711.
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tion of such a trust. These services have their remedy in ali-
mony.' When contribution of services is asserted as the basis for
the claim of trust imposition, only business participation, like
that of an employee or partner, will be sufficient to support the
imposition, and then only to the extent that the spouse seeking
the trust was not adequately compensated for his business parti-
cipation."
PRIMARY CARETAKER PRESUMPTION
In Garska v. McCoy,1 the court adopted a primary caretaker
presumption to control the disposition of child custody issues in-
volving children of tender years, thus modifying the court's pre-
vious presumption favoring maternal custody for children of
tender years.2
In February of 1978 Gwendolyn McCoy moved from her
grandparents' home in Logan County, West Virginia, to her
mother's residence in North Carolina. McCoy was 15 years old
at the time. McCoy became pregnant by Michael Garska, her
mother's live-in companion. In March, McCoy returned to her
grandparents' home. McCoy received no support from Garska
during the pregnancy.'
After birth, the child developed a respiratory infection that
required much medical attention. McCoy's grandfather, Stergil
Altizer, attempted to have the child treated under the medical
provisions of his union benefits. He was informed that such
benefits would be given only if he adopted the child. Therefore,
in October of 1979, McCoy consented to the adoption of the child
by the Altizers. The Altizers petitioned for adoption in the
Logan County Circuit Court in November of 1979. Garska filed a
petition for habeas corpus to secure custody of the child in the
Id. at 712.
Id. at 716.
1 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
2 W. VA. CODE § 44-10-4 (1966) provides that a minor child aged 14 or older
has an absolute right to nominate his own guardian. In the instant case, the court
indicates that a minor below age 14 may also be granted such a preference if he
demonstrates to the trial judge the ability to intelligently express a voluntary
preference for one parent. 278 S.E.2d at 363. Thus, the tender years concept
discussed by the court encompasses all remaining custody situations.
1 278 S.E.2d at 359.
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Logan court in January of 1980. These proceedings were joined
by the Logan court. The Altizers' adoption petition was dismiss-
ed because the child had not resided with them for the requisite
statutory period of six months.' The court then awarded custody
to Garska upon findings that he was generally more economic-
ally, intellectually, and socially capable of caring for the child.
McCoy appealed, claiming the court had erred in not applying
the tender years presumption of maternal custody.5
The presumption of maternal custody for children of tender
years articulated in J.B. v. A.B.' awarded custody to the mother
upon a determination that she met a minimum objective stand-
ard of fitness.7 However, West Virginia statutory law has been
subsequently modified to disallow any presumption as between
the father or mother in determining custody of children of
tender years.$ The court indicated that this modification was not
due to legislative dissatisfaction with the use of presumptions
generally in the area of custody determinations but, rather, in-
dicated dissatisfaction with gender-based presumptions. The
court, therefore, adopted a primary caretaker standard for
determinations of custody of children of tender years. This
presumption operates to grant custody in the parent who is ad-
judged to be the primary caretaker and who also meets the mini-
mum, objective standard of fitness.'
The court's insistence on the use of mechanical rules in the
custody area is based on practical considerations perceived by
the court in this area. Firstly, the court indicates that in the
general child custody dispute between competent parents it is
generally not judicially possible to effectively discern the most
W. VA. CODE § 48-4-1(c) (1980 Replacement Vol.). "No petition for an adop-
tion shall be made or presented until after the child sought to be adopted shall
have lived in the home of the adopted parent or parents for a period of six
months."
278 S.E.2d at 359.
242 S.E.2d at 248 (W. Va. 1978).
278 S.E.2d at 362 n.9, citing provision of emotional support, routine
cleanliness, and nourishing food to the child as requirements for fitness.
, W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1980 Replacement Vol.) states, in relevant part:
In making any such order respecting custody of minor children, there
shall be no legal presumption that, as between the natural parents,
either the father or the mother should be awarded custody of said
children, but the court shall make an award solely on the best interest
of the children based upon the merits of each case.
1 278 S.E.2d at 361.
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fit parent for custody due to the lack of any clear empirical
guidelines in this area." In this context, a presumption acts to
discourage useless litigation. Secondly, on the assumption that
the primary caretaker parent is closer emotionally to the child
and generally in an inferior financial position as compared with
the other parent, the court states that the primary caretaker
parent is willing to compromise alimony and support agree-
ments to retain custody. With a clearly defined presumption in
operation, the custody issue is generally predetermined; so, the
alimony and support issues can be decided on their merits.
Finally, a clearly defined presumption provides guidance to par-
ties who opt to privately determine custody issues."
When applying the primary caretaker mechanism, a trial
court must first make a determination as to the identity of the
primary caretaker parent. The Supreme Court of Appeals arti-
culated several factors to be considered in this analysis. 2 If this
process reveals that both parents shared "in an entirely equal
way,"'3 then no presumption exists and the trial court must then
further inquire into the individual fitness of the parents. But
where the process does result in the identification of a primary
caretaker parent, it must be further shown that such parent also
meets the minimum, objective standard of a fit parent. Where
these two elements exist, then the trial court must award cus-
tody of the child to the primary caretaker parent."
INTERSPOUSAL PROPERTY TRANSFERS
In Marshall v. Marshall,' the court held that merely meeting
statutory requirements of lawfulness and validity2 in the area of
" But cf., The Tender Years Presumption in Child Support Determinations:
J..B. V. A.B., 81 W. VA. L. REV. 149 (1978), for discussion on the general inapplica-
bility of presumptions in the custody area and suggested alternatives.
" 278 S.E.2d at 361-62.
"Id. at 363, citing the factors of planning and preparation of meals; bathing,
grooming and dressing; purchase, care and cleaning of clothes; medical care; ar-
ranging for social interaction with peers; arranging alternative care; putting the
child to bed, attending to him at night, waking the child; disciplining the child;
educating the child; teaching of rudimentary skills, i.e., reading, writing.
13 Id.
"Id.
1 273 S.E.2d 360 (W. Va. 1981).
W. VA. CODE § 48-3-7 (1980 Replacement Vol. states, in relevant part:
[A]ny conveyance or transfer of property, or any interest therein ex-
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interspousal property transfers is not sufficient to sustain such
transfers; the benefitting party of such transfers must also meet
the fiduciary relationship requirement of "scrupulous good
faith"' in such transactions.
The case arose out of the couple's marital breakup. While
they were still together Mrs. Marshall was diagnosed as suffer-
ing from emotional distress and was prescribed medication for
the condition. The couple separated but agreed to attempt a re-
conciliation. However, Mr. Marshall, an attorney, required, as a
prerequisite to such a reconciliation, that Mrs. Marshall transfer
all her interests in their co-owned stocks and realty to him. This
transfer was made with little negotiation or outside consultation
afforded Mrs. Marshall. Their reconciliation failed, and Mr. Mar-
shall filed for divorce. The Cabell County Circuit Court granted
Mrs. Marshall a divorce on her counterclaim of divorce. How-
ever, the trial court found that the pre-divorce property trans-
fers at issue were valid since Mr. Marshall had met the statu-
tory burden of showing that these transfers were lawful and
valid. From this latter holding Mrs. Marshall appealed."
The supreme court rejected Mr. Marshall's contention that
his forebearance on a valid claim of divorce was sufficient consi-
deration for the property transfers at issue to meet the statu-
tory requirement of legality since he eventually did file for
divorce. The court went on to indicate that the statutory re-
quirements for interspousal property transfers articulated in W.
Va. Code § 48-3-7 do not take into account the common law rela-
tionship of confidence and trust that exists between spouses and
the corresponding requirement of application of fiduciary stand-
ard to judge the correctness and fairness of such transfers. The
statutory requirements of lawfulness and validity alone are in-
sufficient to uphold such transfers. The spouse benefitting from
ecuted by either husband or wife to or in favor of the other, directly or
indirectly, shall be valid to the same extent as between other persons;
but if any such conveyance or transfer shall be directly attacked by the
person making such conveyance or transfer .... the party in whose
favor it was made shall have the burden of showing that such convey-
ance or transfer was in all respects lawful and valid.
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such transfers must also show that he exercised "scrupulous
good faith"" in these dealings with the other spouse. The court
reversed and remanded, holding that Mr. Marshall did not meet
this broader test and, therefore, denied the validity of the trans-
fers at issue.7
CONTINUING PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In State ex reL Ravitz v. Fox,1 the court adopted the "con-
tinuing personal jurisdiction" doctrine allowing a West Virginia
circuit court with initial personal jurisdiction over a divorce pro-
ceeding to bind those parties in all subsequent actions growing
out of the original cause of action. Thus, the removal of a party
to another jurisdiction will not defeat the court's ability to bind
that party in subsequent divorce modification proceedings.
The Ravitzs were residents of Monongalia County, West
Virginia, when they were granted a divorce in 1975. Following
the divorce, the wife moved to Florida while the husband re-
mained to complete his education at West Virginia University.
Mr. Ravitz then moved to New Jersey where he resided to the
time of the instant proceedings. In September, 1979, Mrs. Ravitz
initiated a modification proceeding in the Monongalia County
Circuit Court. Notice was given Mr. Ravitz by certified mail,
return receipt requested. Mr. Ravitz appeared specially to con-
test the personal jurisdiction of the court. His motion to dismiss
for lack of jurisdiction was denied, and the circuit court re-
quested information to be submitted for purposes of modifica-
tion. Mr. Ravitz then sought a writ of prohibition to bar the cir-
cuit court judge from further proceedings. The Supreme Court
of Appeals then issued a rule to show cause.2
This question of whether W. Va. Code § 48-2-15 gives a cir-
cuit court power to exercise continuing personal jurisdiction
over parties in a divorce proceeding where both'parties reside
outside the state is one of first impression in West Virginia. The
court held that continuing personal jurisdiction is proper under
6 372 S.E.2d at 363.
273 S.E.2d at 363.
273 S.E.2d 370 (W. Va. 1980).
" Id. at 371-72.
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W. Va. Code § 48-2-15' and that such jurisdiction continues in all
subsequent proceedings arising out of the original divorce ac-
tion. In the related area of notice, the court held that in situa-
tions involving continuing personal jurisdiction, under W. Va.
Code § 48-2-15 due process is satisfied by notice in the form of
certified mail.' Since jurisdiction was recognized and notice suf-
ficient, petitioner's writ was denied.
Jay Leon
W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1980 Replacement Vol.) states in relevant part:
[T]he court may, from time to time [after the ordering of a divorce] ...
revise or alter such order concerning the maintenance of the parties, or
either of them, and make a new order concerning the same ... and the
court may also from time to time afterward . . . revise or alter such
order concerning the care, custody, education and maintenance of the
children, and make a new order concerning the same ...
273 S.E.2d at 373.
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EMPLOYMENT ISSUES
RACIALLY DISCRIMINATORY SENIORITY SYSTEMS
Facially neutral seniority systems that freeze employees in
an inferior position as a result of a previously discriminatory
seniority system may unlawfully perpetuate the discrimination
in violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act.1 In State
Human Rights Commission v. United Transportation Union,2
seventeen black railway yardman or former yardmen of Norfolk
and Western Railroad Company charged their union and
employer with racial discrimination because their seniority
system relegated black employees to inferior positions with less
benefits. Prior to 1956, the collective bargaining agreement de-
signated blacks as "nonpromotable" yardmen, regardless of how
much seniority they had accumulated. White employees, how-
ever, with less seniority than some of the black employees were
promoted over the blacks. The union, which had limited mem-
bership to "white males, sober and industrious", did nothing to
prevent racial discrimination and, apparently, encouraged it.
Even when some of the black employees were eventually pro-
moted in the late 1960s, in seniority they were behind all of the
previously junior white employees who had been promoted
earlier. Those blacks who were still employed by the railroad
when the complaint was filed with the Human Rights Commis-
sion continued to be "bumped" from jobs or outbid for jobs by
the white employees.
After the Human Rights Commission found probable cause
to credit the complainants' allegations, the railroad agreed to
settle by drawing up a new seniority list in which the blacks
would be in their rightful place. The union, by majority vote, re-
jected the settlement and the case ultimately proceeded to the
supreme court.
State Human Rights Commission v. United Transportation
Workers3 essentially raised two questions regarding the West
Virginia Human Rights Act: 1) whether facially neutral seniority
' W. VA. CODE § 5-11-1, et seq. (1979 Replacement Vol.).
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systems which have a racially discriminatory impact are unlaw-
ful?; and 2) when does the ninety day statute of limitations begin
to run in such cases?
According to the Human Rights Act, it is an unlawful discri-
minatory practice "for any labor organization because of race,
religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, age or blindness of
any individual.., to discriminate against such individuals with
respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of em-
ployment or any other matter, directly or indirectly, related to
employment."' Seniority plans obviously effect the terms, condi-
tions or privileges of employment.
The court looked to federal cases under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964' for guidance concerning what constitutes a
discriminatory seniority system. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,'
the United States Supreme Court "'recognized that seniority
systems can violate Title VII by perpetuating discriminatory
practices even if there was no proof of intent and the practices
were facially neutral.' "7
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held, "The
Griggs rationale is consistent with the purpose of our State act
to eliminate employment discrimination. Current practices, re-
gardless of intent, that operate to lock employees into a status
fixed by prior discrimination by perpetuating its effects, violate
the West Virginia Human Rights Act."'
The West Virginia act and the federal act differ in one im-
portant aspect. Even though there may be a prima facie case of
discrimination under Title VII, it may not be a violation because
the federal act exempts bona fide seniority systems9 which may
W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(c) (1979 Replacement Vol.).
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, et seq. (1964).
6 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
280 S.E.2d at 656.
'Id.
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pur-
suant to a bona fide seniority or merit system ... provided that such differences
are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.... ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1964).
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have a discriminatory impact but do not have discriminatory in-
tent. The Griggs principle was reiterated in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States," but the Court
found that the bona fide seniority exemption applied.
Under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, however, there
is no corresponding exemption." The court found that the plain-
tiffs in this case are in "frozen positions" because "they were
denied promotions and consequently the same seniority as their
white counterparts, because of their race. Their inferior rank
persisted. No matter how neutral the seniority system ap-
peared, it was not neutral because the discriminatory base into
which employees originally were cast was therefore always per-
petuated."12
The court also found that remedying the discrimination by
granting the black employees seniority commensurate with
their years of service does not violate a vested property interest
in seniority of white employees who gained their superior ad-
vantage as a result of an unlawful system.
The second major issue addressed was when a complaint
must be filed with the Human Rights Commission. The Human
Rights act requires complaints to be "filed within ninety days
after the alleged act of discrimination."" But when did the alleg-
ed act of discrimination occur in this case? The court found that
the discriminatory act did not cease when blacks become pro-
motable. "[A] seniority system super-imposed on a 'locked-in'
status of discriminatory policies is a continuing violation of the
Act. There is no evidence that these black employees are still
classified 'nonpromotable'; but they continuously suffer because
their seniority system has never compensated them for initially
putting them in inferior positions.""
The court used a three factor test from Montgomery Ward
10 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
" "[I]t shall not be unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to
observe the provisions of any bona fide pension, retirement, group or employee
insurance, or welfare benefit plan or system not adopted as a subterfuge to evade
the provisions of this subdivision." W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (1979 Replacement Vol.).
02 280 S.E.2d at 657.
W' . VA. CODE § 5-11-10 (1979 Replacement Vol.).
14 280 S.E.2d at 658.
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v. Fair Employment Practices Commission 5 to identify a contin-
uing violation:
'(1) Showing that employee was an actual victim of the
discriminatory act.
(2) This discrimination yplaced employee in an inferior status
due to subsequent application of an employment policy
such as seniority, and
(3) That the effects of the past discrimination continued at
least to a date within the limitation period before the filing
of the charge.""
Describing the court's use of the notion of "continuing viola-
tion" as a "metaphysical manipulation of the statute of limita-
tions",' 7 Justice Neely vehemently dissented. He compared the
discriminatory act with a tort for which the statute of limita-
tions starts running once the injury occurs regardless if the pain
lasts indefinitely.
Chief Justice Harshbarger, writing for the majority, criticiz-
ed Justice Neely's analogy by stating that this is not "one tor-
tious act that resulted in one injury that simply kept hurting...
Everytime this seniority system is applied to plaintiffs' status
as defined by their former inclusion in a racially discriminatory
job classification, there is a new injury.""6 Justice Harshbarger
suggested that a more apt analogy is false imprisonment where
every moment of wrongful restraint generates a new basis for
suit. Thus, the operative fact in determining when the limita-
tions period begins to run is the date on which the statutory
violation ceases.
The significance of this case is that it allows a State cause of
action which is unavailable under the corresponding federal
statute by not allowing non-intentionally discriminatory senior-
ity systems to be exempt from the Human Rights Act. Further-
more, it extends a remedy to those harmed by such seniority
systems for an indefinite period of time so long as the harm is a
result of a "continuing violation".
"I 49 Ill. App. 3d 796, 365 N.E.2d 535, 541-42, reh. denied, 365 N.E.2d 542
(1977).
280 S.E.2d at 659.
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PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNION LIABILITY
In the absence of legislation permitting or prohibiting collec-
tive bargaining for public employees, the court found' there is
no common law cause of action for an employer to recover
damages when there is a peaceful, public employee strike. The
court also found that public employee unions which are unincor-
porated associations cannot be sued, although a representative
group of members may be sued.
In Fairmont v. Retai4 Wholesale, and Department Store
Union,2 a group of nurses and other technical employees of Fair-
mont General Hospital, a municipally-owned hospital, wanted to
organize collectively and be represented by Local 1199 of the
National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees. The
employees and the union's business agent requested a meeting
with the hospital management to present a petition signed by
156 employees affirming their desire to be represented by Local
1199. After the management refused to meet, the employees
voted to strike, 145 to nine. Although the employees offered to
establish an emergency care committee, management declined
their offer and decided to close the hospital, except for emer-
gency and out-patient services.
The work stoppage occurred and the employees peacefully
conducted informational picketing at the hospital without ob-
structing ingress or egress. The hospital, after unsuccessfully
seeking a temporary injunction, sued the union, the business
agent, and Jane and John Doe for damages.
The .cause of action asserted was that the "work stoppage
constituted a tortious interference with its business relations or
was a public nuisance in view of the fact that a public employ-
ees' strike is illegal."' The hospital argued that since public
employees have no right to strike, strikes are illegal, and,
therefore, damages are recoverable.
The Circuit Court of Marion County, denying there was a
cause of action, certified five questions to the supreme court,
1 Fairmont v. Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union, slip op.
CC911 (W. Va. Oct. 21, 1980).
2 Id.
3 Id. at 5.
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which restated the questions as: "First, whether as a matter of
law the facts present a substantive cause of action for damages.
Second, whether a labor union may be sued as an entity."' The
court responded negatively to both questions.
Since there is no legislation concerning public employee col-
lective bargaining, the court relied on common law and the first
amendment protection of the right to free speech, association
and assembly. Although the court recognized that public
employers are not obligated to bargain collectively, employees
do have the right to organize, seek voluntary union recognition,
and strike.
We conclude that where public employees who have no employ-
ment contracts with their employers, engage in a work stop-
page which is peaceful and directed only against the employer
with no attempt to interfere with his customers or bar ingress
to other employees there is no common law right to damages. In
this context, the work stoppage is not 'illegal' in the sense that
it gives rise to a common law action for damages
Responding to the hospital's use of the word "illegal", the
court quoted Justice Holmes, "A word is not a crystal, trans-
parent and unchanged; it is the skin of a living thought and may
vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances
and the time in which it is used."' According to common law
principles, a public employee strike is not "illegal" in the sense
that an employee incurs liability for damages.
Although the court never explicitly discussed the potential
impact of deciding against the union, it is worth noting that a
different decision might have had significant implications for all
future public employee labor relations. Had the court found
unlimited liability on the part of unions and individual employ-
ees, the chilling effect on public employee organizing might well
have resulted in the demise of all attempts of unionization in the
public sector. While the court's decision does not encourage
public employee strikes, a contrary decision would clearly pre-
vent them.
Concerning the suability of a labor union as an entity, the
'Id. at 2.
Id. at 13.
Id. at n. 7 [quoting Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)].
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court reviewed several potentially applicable statutes7 but found
that none applied to unincorporated associations of public
employee unions. As stated in State ex reL Glass Blowers Asso-
ciation v. Silver,' suits against unincorporated associations are
allowed simply by joining a representative group of its mem-
bers.9
Although this case clearly protects public employees and
their unions from tort liability for peaceful strikes, there are
several related issues that were not addressed: (1) may a public
employer discharge or replace strikers?; (2) is there a cause of
action to "protect" the public interest for an injunction to stop
public employee strikes, even though there is no cause of action
for damages?; and (3) whether the court would find a statute pro-
hibiting public employee strikes an unconstitutional violation of
the right to free speech, association, and assembly. It is clear
that even in the absence of some form of public employee legisla-
tion, the court is hesitant to develop its own complete public
policy on the issue."
POLITICAL RIGHTS OF DEPUTY SHERIFFS
By upholding the constitutionality of West Virginia's rough
equivalent of the Federal Hatch Act for deputy sheriffs,' the
supreme court essentially rewrote the statute,2 attempting to
make it consistent with the United States Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States Civil Service Commission v. National
Association of Letter Carriers.'
The court reviewed: a) FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b), which allows suits against
unincorporated associations for the purpose of protecting substantive rights
created by federal law or the Constitution; but there is no corresponding provi-
sion in the W. VA. R. Civ. P. protecting state created rights; (b) the Labor
Management Relations Act for the Private Sector, W. Va. Code § 21-1A-1, et seq.
(1981 Replacement Vol.), which allows suits by and against private sector unions,
but does not apply to the public sector; c) the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C.A. § 141, et seq., which also does not apply to the public sector.
g 151 W. Va. 749, 155 S.E.2d 564 (1967).
9 slip op. CC911 at 15.
10 Id. at 13-14. See Kincaid, Resolving Public Employee Disputes: A Guide
for West Virginia, 79 W. VA. L. REv. 23 (1976).
' Weaver v. Shaffer, slip. op. 204-80 (W. Va. Dec. 19, 1980).
2 W. VA..CODE § 7-14-15(a) (1976 Replacement Vol.).
3 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
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The West Virginia statute reads, in part, that "... . no deputy
sheriff covered by the provisions of this article shall engage in
any political activity of any kind, character or nature what-
soever, except to cast his vote at any election or shall act as an
election official in any municipal, county or state election.
4
Recognizing that the statute could be considered overbroad
by violating an employee's first amendment rights,' the court
found that it would not be unconstitutional if given "the appro-
priate narrow interpretation."" Thus, the broad language of W.
Va. Code § 7-14-15(a) was interpreted to proscribe nine political
activities:
(1) holding a party office; (2) working at the polls; (3) acting
as a party paymaster for other party workers; (4) organizing a
political party or club; (5) actively participating in fundraising
activities for a partisan candidate or political party; (6) becom-
ing a partisan candidate for, or campaigning for, an elective
public office; (7) actively managing the campaign of a partisan
candidate for public office; (8) initiating or circulating a partisan
nominating petition or soliciting votes (i.e., campaigning) for a
partisan candidaVe for public office; and (9) serving as a dele-
gate, alternate or a proxy to a political party convention.
7
In Weaver v. Shaffer, the petitioner, a deputy sheriff, was
dismissed from his position because he participated in the cam-
paign of a candidate for sheriff of Boone County. After the op-
posing candidate won the election for sheriff, he discharged the
petitioner under W. Va. Code § 7-14-15(a). Weaver argued that
the statute "denies his constitutional right to free political ex-
pression because it is both vague and impermissibly broad in its
scope."'
Writing for the court, Justice Neely reviewed the United
States Supreme Court's use of the overbreadth doctrine and
determined that the first consideration is whether there is a
legitimate governmental interest here in restricting individual
rights. Citing United Public Workers v. Mitchell,9 Justice Neely
W. VA. CODE § 7-14-15(a) (1976 Replacement Vol.).




330 U.S. 75 (1947).
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found there is a legitimate state purpose because "such restric-
tions are designed to insure advancement based on merit in the
government service and to protect employees from improper
political influence.""0
Although there is a legitimate governmental interest in an
efficient civil service, the statute "could be erroneously con-
strued to proscribe more than that allowed.""1 To avoid an erron-
eous construction, the court was presented with a choice of
"whether this statute can be cured by judicial construction or
must be struck down in its entirety."12
The court reviewed the Supreme Court's application of the
overbreadth doctrine to strike down statutes and concluded that
the Supreme Court has almost entirely retreated from such a
drastic remedy. The court asserted"3 that since Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres,' there was only one case in which the Court
used overbreath to avoid a statute, Village of Shaumberg v.
Citizens, etc."6 Because the court is reluctant to strike down a
statute, it looked to a less drastic remedy to cure the potentially
unconstitutional interpretation. Applying essentially the same
prohibitions as the Supreme Court allowed in Letter Carriers,
the court narrowed the statute's prohibitions to nine, more
specific, activities.
The analysis of the state constitutional issue under art. III, §
7 was similar to the analysis of the federal constitutional issues.
Justice Neely applied the "doctrine of the least intrusive
10 204-80 at 4. Once a legitimate governmental interest has been established,
courts generally look to whether the approach taken is the least restrictive alter-
native in interfering with individual rights, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347
(1976). The supreme court, however, did not conduct such an analysis after finding
there was a legitimate governmental interest. It appears, however, that the goal
of an honest, efficient civil service which is protected from conflicts of interest
may be achieved by only punishing those individuals who abuse their position
rather than preventing all deputy sheriffs from engaging in all political activity:
There may be several less restrictive alternatives.
11d. at n. 2.
12 Id. at 5.
11 Id. at 8.
" 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
1. 444 U.S. 620 (1980). However, there seem to be several cases since 1976,
when Young v. Mini Theatres was decided, where the Court voided statutes and
ordinances for overbreadth. e.g.; First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belioti, 435 U.S.
765 (1978); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95-97 (1977).
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remedy, an easily understood principle which permits a statute
which is unconstitutional on its face to be saved from total de-
struction by judicial construction."1
The court justified limiting the construction of the statute
by noting that the Deputy Sheriffs Civil Service Act contains a
severability clause17 requiring that only unconstitutional provi-
sions be struck without finding the entire Act invalid. The court
asserted that if the job protection afforded in other sections of
the Act is maintained while the prohibitions on political activity
are struck, there would be a "classified civil service which is en-
tirely free to participate in the most robust manner in the poli-
tical process and, through that process, achieve increases in
salary, lavish perquisites, and opulent working conditions
through political extortion."18
While the court recognized that the legislature could pass a
new statute to replace W. Va. Code § 7-14-15(a), Justice Neely
found there is a small chance that it would because of (1) the now
unrestricted lobbying of civil servants, (2) legislative inertia, and
(3) the lack of an organized pressure group to support such legis-
lation.!9 He concluded, therefore, that it is the job of the court to
construe the statute in a constitutional manner.
In Justice Caplan's dissent, 0 he argued that W. Va. Code §
7-14-15(a) is "overbroad and vague and should therefore by void-
ed in its entirety."21 Although there may be a legitimate govern-
mental interest in restricting political activities of civil servants,
the statute must be sufficiently clear and specific to provide a
reasonable standard for guidance, "adequate warning of what
activity is proscribed."'
204-80 at 10.
* W. VA. CODE § 7-14-21 (1976 Replacement Vol.)
" 204-80 at 11.
1' Id. at 12. Assuming, arguendo, that the legislature would not pass a new
statute, the court fails to explain why it is, therefore, the proper role of the
judiciary to legislate in such a case.
2 As the time of writing this Overview, the case has not been published.
The court's opinion represents only Justice Neely; Justice Caplan dissented;
Justice McGraw dissented and reserved the right to file a dissenting opinion;
Justice Harshbarger and Justice Miller concurred and reserved the right to file
concurring opinions.
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Restrictions on first amendment rights, in particular, war-
rant the greatest degree of judicial scrutiny and must always be
narrowly drawn and narrowly interpreted. "Overbreadth and
vagueness in the first amendment area must be strictly curtail-
ed because ambiguity and the broad sweep of a statute may in-
hibit citizens from exercising their fundamental constitutional
rights.""
Justice Caplan distinguished W. Va. Code § 7-14-15(a) from
the statutes involved in Broadrick v. Oklahoma" and United
States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Let-
ter Carriers15 because the latter two were more narrowly drawn
and were supplemented by administrative pronouncements,
W. Va. Code, 1931, 7-14-15(a), as amended, regulates political ac-
tivity in a much broader sweep and with less specificity than
the Act construed in Broadrick and Letter Carriers. If the
Supreme Court can characterize the Broadrick statute, § 818 as
"slightly overbroad," then Code 7-14-15(a) is clearly substantial-
ly overbroad. It prohibits the universe of a deputy sheriff's con-
ceivable political activities except voting. None of the factors
mentioned in Broadrick or Letter Carriers providing limitations
or guidelines are found here. There are no limiting regulations;
there is no body of doctrine; there is no office for interpretive
guidance; and, most importantly, no judicial construction of the
section can eliminate its overbreadth and also provide the re-
quisite degree of clarity without transgressing into the legisla-
tive function."6
The Weaver decision still leaves several issues unresolved.
The nine categories of prohibitions may need to be interpreted
further before it is clear just what deputy sheriffs are allowed
to do. Additionally, because of the wide disparity between the
plain meaning of § 7-14-15(a) and the court's interpretation of it,
there may be increased confusion resulting in a significant chill-
ing effect on deputy sheriffs' exercise of their first amendment
rights.'7
' Id. at 2.
2 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
21 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
" 204-80, dissent at 5.
2 For an analysis and critique of Weaver, see generally Brief for Petitioner,
Larabee v. Raleigh County Civil Service Comm., currently before the supreme








In two occupational disease cases decided in the survey
period,1 the court discussed the legal and medical definitions of
occupational disease as well as the distinction between occupa-
tional disease and injury. The court also continued its trend in
applying the "liberality rule"2 by construing evidence in a man-
ner most favorable to the claimant.
In Powell v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner
the court held that lung cancer caused by occupational exposure
to asbestos is a compensable occupational disease "even though
it can also be an ordinary disease of life which occurs in the
general public."4
To recover under the Workmen's Compensation Act for an
occupational disease which may also be a non-occupational
disease, it must be:
apparent to the rational mind, upon consideration of all the cir-
cumstances (1) that there is a direct causal connection between
the conditions under which work is performed and the occupa-
tional disease, (2) that it can be seen to have followed as a
natural incident of the work as a result of the exposure occa-
sioned by the nature of the employment, (3) that it can be fairly
traced to the employment as the proximate cause, (4) that it does
not come from a hazard to which workmen would have been
equally exposed outside of the employment, (5) that it is inciden-
tal to the character of the business and not independent of the
relation of employer and employee, and (6) that it must appear
to have had its origin in a risk connected with the employment
and to have flowed from that source as a natural consequence,
though it need not have been foreseen or expected before its
contraction.5
Using these six criteria, when an employee suffers from a
disease which may occur in the general population, the employee
' Powell v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 273 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1980);
Donaldson v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, slip op. 168-80 (W. Va. Nov. 25,1980).
1 For a review of the development of the "liberality rule", see Flannery, The
Expanding Role of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in the Review
of Workmen's Compensation Appeals, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 33-44 (1979).
273 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1980).
Id. at 833.
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-1 (1981 Replacement Vol.)
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must provide "sufficient proof that it was contracted in the course
of and as a result of employment,"8 but "it is not claimant's
burden to negative all possible non-occupational causes of his in-
jury.' 7
The court also discussed the difficulty in proving causality
where there is a long latency period between exposure to a hazard
and the manifestation of the disease. Causality in such a case is
much more difficult to prove than in an occupational accident
case. Proof of causality depends on the current state of scientific
knowledge. "If studies and research clearly link a disease to a
particular hazard of a workplace, a prima facie case of causation
arises upon a 5howing that the claimant was exposed to the
hazard and is suffering from the disease to which it is
connected."8 Once medical science begins to define a disease as
potentially occupationally-related, it may be compensable as an
occupational disease under the definition in the Act.
It is unclear from the court's opinion how much scientific
evidence is required to raise the presumption, especially where
there is considerable debate over whether a particular disease
may be occupationally-related. Although the court cites the six
statutory criteria, it goes on to formulate its own test of causality.
Apparently, if the claimant can show any studies or research
finding, it may be sufficient to raise the presumption if the ex-
posure and medical requirements are met.
The court reversed the Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Board's final order denying benefits to the claimant in
Donaldson v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner
because the Appeal Board mistakenly evaluated the employee's
claim as an accident claim rather than an occupational disease-
claim resulting from repeated exposure to toxic chemicals in the
workplace."0 There was evidence that the types of chemicals to
which claimant was exposed are known to produce liver damage
and that the claimant did suffer from liver damage.
' 273 S.E.2d at 835 [citing Huff v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 157 W.
Va. 530, 202 S.E.2d 343 (1974)].
Id. [citing Myers v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r. 239 S.E.2d 124, 127
(W. Va. 1977)].
' Id. at 837.
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Although there was conflicting medical evidence in the case,
the court applied the "liberality rule" that the evidence be "con-
strue[d] in the light most favorable to the claimant."" Even
though claimant's expert was outnumbered five to one, the
quality of the opinions was more important than the quantity.
Joyce Goldstein
DUE PROCESS IN DISMISSALS
The developments in this area over the past year appear to
follow the analysis used in the court's previous due process deci-
sions.1 When a property interest is inviolved, the extent of due
process protection afforded to a person asserting the right
hinges upon three considerations: (1) the private interests that
are affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation through the
procedures used, and whether there exists a more substantial
procedural safeguard; and (3) the government's interest in terms
of fiscal and administrative burdens involved. The court has
been fairly liberal in determining what a property interest is,
extending it to "benefits to which an individual may be deemed
to have a legitimate claim of entitlement under existing rules or
understandings."'
In Evans v. West Virginia Board of Regents4 a student at
the West Virginia School of Osteopathic Medicine was granted a
one year leave of absence for medical reasons, after he had al-
ready completed two and one-half years of schooling. However,
Evans did not inforni the school of his desire to resume his educ-
ation until about two months after his medical leave had ex-
pired; thereupon, the Dean informed him that he would have to
reapply. He did but was denied admission. The court ruled that
the appellant had "a sufficient property interest in the continua-
t, Id. at 8.
W. VA. CONST., art. 3, § 10 provides: "No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law, and the judgment of his peers."
See McLendon v. Morton, 249 S.E.2d 919 (W. Va. 1978); Waite v. Civil Service
Commission, 241 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1978); North v. West Virginia Board of
Regents, 233 S.E.2d 411 (W. Va. 1977).
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
S Waite v. Civil Service Commission, 241 S.E.2d at 165.
271 S.E.2d 778 (W. Va. 1980).
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tion and completion of his medical education to warrant the im-
position of minimal procedural due process protections."' The
court rejected the idea that Evans had forfeited his property
rights and was reduced to the same level as an original applicant
to the school. After two and one-half years of attendance and at-
tainment of a B + average, he had a reasonable expectation that
he would be permitted to complete his education, absent a show-
ing of reasons to the contrary.' Since no reasons, procedures or
hearing were given to Evans, the court ordered his immediate
reinstatement; but if the school should still deny his admission,
the court laid out the procedures that must be afforded to him.
These included: (1) a formal notice of reasons; (2) a sufficient op-
portunity to prepare a defense; (3) the opportunity to have coun-
sel present at any hearing; (4) the right to confront accusers and
present his own evidence; (5) a fair tribunal; and (6) an adequate
record of the proceedings.'
In Clarke v. West Virginia Board of Regents,' the court con-
sidered for the first time what procedures are due a tenured
professor when he is being dismissed. First of all, the conclu-
sion was quickly reached that a substantial property and liberty
interest was involved that warranted due process protection.
Appellant argued that since the rights involved were substan-
tial, the notice9 he received as to the charges against him lacked
the requisite specificity to meet the high standards required by
IcL at 780.
The court distinguishes this case from Board of Curators of the University
of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, where no procedural due process violation
occurred when a student was dismissed for academic reasons (as distinguished
from disciplinary reasons) without any type of formal hearing. The Court in
Horowitz said due process safeguards are not pressing when a student is dismiss-
ed for academic reasons; since Evans ostensibly was not dismissed for academic
reasons, Horowitz and Evans are dissimilar.
' These requirements come from North, where a student was expelled from
Medical School at WVU after he was accused of giving false information on his en-
trance application. The court there concluded that a student's "interest in obtain-
ing a higher education with its concomitant economic opportunities, coupled with
the obvious monetary expenditure in attaining such educaton, gives rise to a suffi-
cient property interest to require procedural due process on a removal." 233
S.E.2d at 415.
a 279 S.E.2d 169 (W. Va. 1981).
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Snyder v. Civil Service Commission."0 Even though the notice to
Clarke did not contain dates and names, the court found it to be
adequate since the specific acts in question were "so singular in
nature that there can be no doubt as to the activity in question."'1
Also, other charges against Clarke pertained to a continuing
course of conduct which would be almost impossible to particu-
larize, e.g., not spending enough time on campus. It was appar-
ent that Clarke was aware of all the facts and charges against
him as evidenced from his answers and denials. The court consi-
dered the administrative burden involved in documenting all of
the details and did not strictly require the rote following of
standards. The ultimate test of the sufficiency of the notice is
whether the employee was informed with reasonable certainty
of the nature of the charge. Although the court held the notice
to be sufficient in this case, it remarked that the notice was far
from exemplary and should ideally be sufficient on its face,
thereby avoiding protracted litigation.
The next major argument advanced by Clarke was that the
hearing examiner's report was inadequate, since neither the
evidence relied upon nor any reasons were given to support the
examiner's conclusion that petitioner should be dismissed. (It
should be noted that the hearing itself was not challenged as in-
sufficient.) 3 The court agreed. Although neither statute nor the
Policy Bulletin expressly requires the hearing examiner to state
on the record the reasons for his decision, the court found that
the Policy Bulletin clearly contemplates such a requirement.
Two reasons were given for requiring an adequate statement of
the grounds for the decision. First, it is essential that the ap-
pellate court, in order to perform its reviewing function, have a
,0 238 S.E.2d 842 (W. Va. 1977). This case dealt with a defective notice due to
its lack of specificity. There, an employee was charged with falsifying travel ex-
penses, but the notice did not indicate when this occurred in particular. The court
stated that the notice must contain the date, unless there is no question of when
the conduct occurred. Also, if persons or property are involved, these must be
identified.
Clarke, 279 S.E.2d at 176.
" It should be remembered that this (administrative burden) is the third
criteria regarding due process mentioned in the first paragraph of this section.
1 Policy Bulletin No. 36 of the West Virginia Board of Regents lays out the
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record to review. If none exists, no review can be made. Second,
a record gives the person seeking review a basis upon which he
can assert his ground for review and upon which he can allege
error with particularity. The court remanded the case in order
for the hearing examiner to state the reasons and evidence he
relied upon in making his recommendation."'
The last issue faced in Clarke was whether a post-dismissal
hearing could be legally sufficient. The court held that the
Policy Bulletin intended a pre-deprivation hearing, and also
reasserted the position that "due process must generally be
given before a deprivation occurs unless a compelling public
policy dictates otherwise. ' 17 The court recognized that pre-
deprivation hearings may be forgone if the person presents
some sort of danger, threat, or disruption to the academic pro-
cess. Here, the interest of the college in protecting the educa-
tional process was said to outweigh Clarke's liberty interest in
pursuing his occupation. However, the college's interest did not
justify depriving him of his property interest (e.g., his salary).
Therefore, the court came to a compromise whereby Clarke
could be suspended with pay.
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES
In reviewing county school board decisions regarding
employees, the court during the survey period has been adamant
in applying the principle that an administrative body must abide
by the procedures it has properly established. The court has
also stressed that school personnel laws are to be strictly con-
strued in favor of the personnel.
Central to many school board dismissal cases is Policy No.
5300(6)(a) of the Policies, Rules and Regulations of the West
Virginia Board of Education. This section says that any decision
concerning promotion, demotion, transfer, or termination should
" Justice Neeley disagreed. In his dissent he saw no reason to require a
record containing the evidence relied upon, since it is unnecessary and not re-
quired by either statute or case law. He considers a record to be part of a "maze
of technical regulations and procedures" that must be performed "without a
single slip:' He feels the ability of the college president to dispose of incompetent
professors has been removed due to the court's creation of "'Simple Simon' and
'Mother May r procedures." 279 S.E.2d at 182.
15 North, 233 S.E.2d at 417.
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be based upon an evaluation made known to the employee on a
regular basis and, furthermore, that the employee be given an
opportunity for improving job performance prior to the termina-
tion or transfer.1
In Mason County Board of Education v. State Superinten-
dent of Schools,2 the school board dismissed a high school prin-
cipal for incompetence and willful neglect of duties. Pursuant to
W. Va. Code § 18A-2-8,' the principal appealed to the State
Superintendent of Schools, who overruled the school board's
decision. The Board then appealed to the circuit court which ruled
that the Board did not have standing to seek judicial review;
however, the Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that the county
school board did have standing. Upon remand, the circuit court
held that despite 5300(6)(a), W. Va. Code § 18A-2-8 clearly em-
powered a board of education to dismiss a school employee. This
code section provides in part: "Notwithstanding any other provi-
sions of law, a board may suspend or dismiss any person in its
employment at any time for: Immorality, incompetency, cruelty,
insubordination, intemperance or willful neglect of duty . .
(emphasis added).
On appeal in Mason County Board of Education, (the case
under review here), the Supreme Court of Appeals limited the
seemingly broad powers delegated to the school board by W. Va.
Code § 18A-2-8;1 and based upon Trimboli v. Wayne County
Board of Education," held that a school board was prohibited
from dismissing for incompetency without following the evalua-
§ 5300(6)(a) states:
"Every employee is entitled to know how well he is performing his
job, and should be offered the opportunity of open and honest evalua-
tion of his performance on a regular basis. Any decision concerning pro-
motion, demotion, transfer, or termination of employment should be
based upon such evaluation, and not upon factors extraneous thereto.
Every employee is entitled to the opportunity of improving his job per-
formance prior to the termination or transferring of his services, and
can only do so with assistance of regular evaluation."
274 S.E.2d 435 (W. Va. 1980).
This section provides inter alia that "when the board is not unanimous in
its decision to suspend or dismiss, the person so suspended or dismissed shll
have the right of appeal to the state superintendent of schools."
Mason Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. State Supt., 234 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 1977).
I See Beverline v. Lewis Cty. Bd. of Educ., 216 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1975).
254 S.E.2d 561 (W. Va. 1979).
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tion procedure of Policy No. 5300(6)(a) of Policies, Rules and
Regulations of the West Virginia Board of Education. Trimboli
held that 5300(6)(a) must be followed if the circumstances form-
ing the basis for suspension or discharge are "correctable." The
court then said, "[w]hat is 'correctable' conduct does not lend
itself to an exact definition but must ... be understood to mean
offense or conduct which affects professional competency."7
Policy No. 5300(6)(a) does not apply to conduct which is ir-
remediable or permanent.
In sum, in every proceeding under W. Va. Code § 18A-2-8,
for the dismissal of a school employee due to incompetence or
misconduct, West Virginia Board' of Education Policy No.
5300(6(a) must be followed. This policy provides for (1) evalua-
tion of job performance and (2) an opportunity to improve ex-
isting inadequacies. Failure to follow these procedures prohibits
the board from demoting, transferring or discharging an em-
ployee.' In addition, the court made clear that such evaluations
must be conducted by someone qualified to do so and that board
members are not qualified.9 A proper evaluation is one made by
a professional supervisor such as a county superintendent.
When the school board has the authority to decide whether
to suspend or dismiss an employee (assuming Policy No.
5300(6)(a) has been complied with or does not apply), W. Va. Code
§ 18A-2-8 provides inter alia that when the board is not
unanimous in its decision, the employee shall have the right of
appeal to the state superintendent. The question raised in Eskew
v. Kanawha County Board of Education0 was whether the em-
ployee, after appealing to the state superintendent, also has a
right to judicial review of the board's decision by way of cer-
' Mason County Bd. of Educ., 274 S.E.2tl at 439 quoting Trimboli, 254 S.E.2d
at 567.
' J. Neeley does not agree. He feels it createsd unnecessary burdens on
public school administration. He also believes Policy No. 5300(6)(a) does not create
a duty to provide any employee with an evaluation and an opportunity to im-
prove: that its wording lacks any mandatory language. Furthermore, he would
rather see the board of education handle personnel matters, because the board is
controlled by the electorate. As he puts it, "I still believe that the vote means
something." Trimboli v. Bd. of Educ., 257 S.E.2d 561 (W. Va. 1979) (Neely, J.,
dissenting opinion).
See Rogers v. Bd. of Educ., 125 W. Va. 579, 25 S.E.2d 537 (1943).
s 280 S.E.2d 297 (W. Va. 1981).
[Vol. 84
88
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 10
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol84/iss2/10
SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS
tiorari in the circuit court pursuant to W. Va. Code § 53-3-2."
The court, after citing a previous decision which granted the
board of education the right to seek judicial review of an ad-
verse administrative decision by a state school superintendent,
1 2
now has extended this right to employees. Thus, a person dis-
missed by the board by less than a unanimous vote can now ap-
peal to the state superintendent pursuant to W. Va. Code
§ 18A-2-8, and then upon an adverse ruling, appeal to the circuit
court.
The court in Wayne County Board of Education v. Tooley"3
held that when an employee has a right to a hearing, the school
board can make no decisions prior to the hearing. Here, the board
voted to accept the county school superintendent's recommenda-
tion to discharge the employee because the position of secretary
at the bus garage was no longer needed. Subsequently, the em-
ployee was notified by the superintendent of his re-
commendation and informed of her right to a hearing before the
board pursuant to W. Va. Code § 18A-2-6. A hearing was held,
but the vote was against the employee. She appealed to the
state superintendent, who ruled that the board had improperly
dismissed her. The board sought review in the circuit court,
which found that W. Va. Code § 18A-2-6 was complied with. In
reversing the circuit court, the Supreme Court of Appeals said
that in order for a hearing to be meaningful the board must not
make any prior decision concerning the employee before the
hearing is held.
In State ex reL Hawkins v. Tyler County Board of Educa-
tion," the issue before the court was whether a school board had
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in attempting to transfer a
teacher for refusing to assume certain extracurricular activities.
The court recognized that school boards and superintendents
have great discretion to transfer and assign teachers pursuant
" W. VA. CODE § 53-3-2, reads in pertinent part: "In every ... proceeding
before ... an inferior tribunal, the record of proceeding may .... after any judg-
ment or order therein abridging the freedom of a person, be removed by a writ of
certiorari to the circuit court of the county in which such judgment was
rendered."
" Mason Cty. Bd. of Educ., 234 S.E.2d 321 (W. Va. 1977).
13 276 S.E.2d 826 (W. Va. 1981).
1 275 S.E.2d 908 (W. Va. 1980).
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to W. Va. Code § 18A-2-7, and that teachers have no vested
right to be assigned to any particular school in a county. How-
ever this discretion is not unlimited, but must be exercised in a
reasonable way and in the best interests of the school. Since ex-
tracurricular activities play such a vital role in the educational
process, a school board is justified in reassigning a teacher for
refusal to participate. But the board's power to assign these
duties in the first place must be exercised in a reasonable man-
ner; that is, it cannot be discriminatory or require excessive
hours and should relate to the teacher's interest and expertise.
Also, the assignment must not interfere with the teacher's pri-
mary instructional duties or classroom efficiency. At this point,
because evidence was lacking whether the duties in question
would have interfered with classroom teaching abilities, the
court remanded the case for further findings. If classroom effi-
ciency would have been adversely affected, then the board acted
arbitrarily; if no adverse effects, then the reassignment was
legitimate.
In response to the board's assertion that the activity in
question (coaching) was part of the teacher's employment duties,
the court said that for this assignment to be be valid there must
be sufficient provisions in the actual employment contract; ab-
sent any such provisions, the board cannot transfer, suspend, or
dismiss on contractual grounds for refusal to perform additional
duties."5
Finally, the court held that Policy No. 5300(6)(a) does not ap-
ply here since no allegations of misconduct or incompetency
were made.
In State ex rel Wilson v. Truby,5 the court gave effect to
Part III of the West Virginia Department of Education Employee
Handbook.17 Here, petitioner applied for the vacant position of
11 J. Neeley dissents. He stresses that the boards of education and
superintendents must be given room to run thorough and efficient schools. Also,
"schools should be run for the benefit of the children and not for the benefit of the
administrators or employees in the system." Hawkins, 275 S.E.2d at 918, (Neely,
J., dissenting opinion).
16 281 S.E.2d 231 (W. Va. 1981).
Part I provides in part: "Applicants for professional positions will be in-
terviewed and recommended by the Bureau Assistant Superintendent. Final deci-
sion regarding approvals will be made by the State Superintendent... ." Wilson,
281 S.E.2d at 235.
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assistant state superintendent. Upon notice that he was not
selected for an interview, he requested reasons for the rejection,
relying on Policy No. 5300(6)(a). The State Superintendent
responded by contending that No. 5300 only applies to county
school personnel and that the West Virginia Department of
Education Handbook covers State Department of Education per-
sonnel. In essence, the court agreed with the State Superinten-
dent, but found Part III of the Handbook to entitle applicants
with objective qualifications to an interview."
Although the court did enforce the Handbook procedures, it
also took into consideration possible administrative burdens and
thus limited the interview entitlements to only those applicants
objectively qualified. This is consistent with an earlier case
where a teacher who satisfied objective eligibility standards for
tenure adopted by a state college was deemed to have more
than a unilateral expectation, therefore requiring a certain
degree of procedural due process.19 In Wilson, the court declared
that in providing interviews for department professional em-
ployees, the State board had gone beyond those rights which are
constitutionally required; but, nevertheless, the board must
follow its own Handbook.
The trend of the court is to expand procedural due process
rights of school employees. With its constructions of various
statutes and policies, and by insisting that board decisions must
not be arbitrary or capricious, the court is curtailing much of the
discretion previously enjoyed by county school boards.
Bob Goldberg
" The court did not explicitly state whether Policy No. 5300(6)(a) applies
here or not, but simply said the Handbook applies.
11 McLendon v. State ex. rel. Morton, 249 S.E.2d 919 (W. Va. 1978).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Recently, in a landmark decision in administrative law,1 the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that sections of
the Administrative Procedures Act, which empowered a legisl-
ative rule-making review committee to veto rules and regula-
tions otherwise validly promulgated by State agencies, violated
the separation of powers doctrine embodied in the State Con-
stitution.2
In 1976, in an effort to enhance administrative accountability
and responsiveness, 3 the Legislature amended4 the West Virginia
Administrative Procedures Act, creating a new legislative body:
the Legislative Rule-Making Review Committee.' This committee
was a bi-partisan body, consisting of six members of the Senate
and six members of the House of Delegates. The President of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House, who were ex-officio,
non-voting members, designated the co-chairman of the commit-
tee and appointed its members. Staff personnel were provided
to supply the expertise necessary to deal with the complexity of
the rules and regulations being reviewed. The mission of the
committee was to "review all rules or regulations of the several
agencies following the proposal thereof...,"
To give teeth to this review mechanism, the committee was
given plenary power to veto administrative rules and regula-
tions, subject only to reversal by the entire legislature: "No
adoption, amendment or repeal of any rule or regulation ... shall
be effective until ... approved by the rule or regulation commit-
tee."7 After presentation of the proposed rule by the agency, the
' Courts have previously been very reluctant to address the issue. See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); McCorkle v. United States, 559 F.2d 1258 (4th
Cir. 1977), cert. den. 434 U.S. 1011 (1978); Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.),
affd sub nom. without opinion Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977). Contra.
State v. A.L.I.V.E. Voluntary, 606 P.2d 769 (Alaska 1980).
2 State ex rel Barker v. Manchin, 279 S.E.2d 622 (W. Va. 1981).
See generally Neely, Rights and Responsibilities in Administrative Rule-
Making in West Virginia, 79 W. VA. L. REv. 513 (1977).
1976 W. Va. Acts, ch. 117.
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committbe had six months within which to approve or disapprove,
in whole or in part, the proposal. The committee's failure to act
within this time period was deemed approval. After agency ap-
proval or disapproval, the Legislature had thirty days to re-
verse the committee's decision; upon expiration of this period
the rule or regulation automatically became effective. However,
formal approval by the Legislature was only required in the
limited circumstance of committee disapproval of a rule design-
ed to implement "a federally subsidized or assisted program,"8
otherwise approval or disapproval by the Legislature was
discretionary.
The case arose when certain rules and regulations pro-
mulgated by the Director of Mines governing surface mine safety
were disapproved by the committee, whose decision was not re-
versed by the Legislature. Barker, who was a surface miner,
contended that the provisions of the Administrative Procedures
Act creating the committee were unconstitutional and void, and
thus, the Secretary of State had a nondiscretionary duty to file
the rules and regulations, thereby giving them the force and ef-
fect of law. After dealing with preliminary issues of justiciable
controversy,9 mootness,'0 the propriety of declaratory judgment
proceedings,' standing,12 the need to join an indispensible
.kL
d The court determined that the petition set "forth facts sufficient in quantity
and substance to state a justiciable controversy." 279 S.E.2d at 628.
,0 Although the rules and regulations had been filed at the time of the deci-
sion, they were classified as "obsolete." The court concluded that because "the
relief requested is that they be filed as 'final' and 'in force and effect,' the claim
that the relief sought has been granted is specious on its face." Thus, the case was
not moot. Id.
,1 The court held that a declaratory judgment action was not appropriate
since "the need for a definitive resolution is apparent." Id. The court added:
"'[We] find in the case before us that the alleged deprivations of petitioner's
rights are capable of being repeated under numerous variations of a basic recurr-
ing factual pattern, in spite of all other available administrative and legal
remedies if no definitive resolutions of these issues are provided by this Court.'"
[Quoting Walls v. Miller, 251 S.E.2d 491, 495-96 (W. Va. 1978) ].
12 The court rejected the contention that "direct injury" or "special or
pecuniary interest must be shown by individuals who sue in this capacity,'"
[Quoting State ex rei Brotherton v. Moore, 230 S.E.2d 638, 640-41 (W. Va. 1976) ].
"In the present case the relator, in addition to being a citizen and a taxpayer, is a
coal miner on a surface mine operation." Id. at 629.
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party,"3 and the nature of the controversy as a political
question," Justice McGraw, writing for the court, held that the
statutory rule-making review mechanism violated the separa-
tion of powers doctrine embodied in article V, § 1 of the West
Yirginia Constitution."5
Justice McGraw's opinion continues the court's staunch pre-
servation of the separation of powers within this state:" "This
constitutional provision which prohibits any one department of
our state government from exercising the powers of the others
is not merely a suggestion; it is part of the fundamental law of
our State and, as such, it must be strictly construed and closely
followed."" The court's strict scrutiny yielded two grounds of
unconstitutionality. First, after examining the powers and the
duties of both the legislative and executive branches, the court
found that this mechanism of legislative veto permitted the Leg-
islature to exercise power properly exercised by the Governor.
Closely resembling the Governor's veto power, this legislative
veto power "reverses the constitutional concept of government
whereby the Legislature enacts the law subject to the approval
or veto of the Governor."8 Second, after analyzing the strict
substantive and procedural constitutional limitations placed
upon the power of the Legislature to enact law, the court con-
cluded that "[t]hese constitutional provisions clearly limit the
power of the Legislature to give the binding effect of law to its
actions. It may create law only by following the formal enact-
ment process. Where it seeks to give legal force to its informal
actions, the Legislature exceeds the limits of its constitutional
authority."'9
13 The court also rejected the contention that the failure to join the Director
of the Department of Mines invalidated the petition for failing to join an indispen-
sible party; concluding that while "[hie is an interested and concerned party ... in
the context of this litigation he is not a necessary or indispensable party." Ida at 630.
14 Rejecting the contention that the suit represented a political question, the
court stated: "Our determination of the issues in this case does not represent a
political policy choice by the Court. Indeed, for our purposes the specific content
of the rules in question is immaterial." Id.
Id. at 636.
1' See State ex reL Brotherton v. Blankenship, 214 S.E.2d 467 (W. Va. 1975);
State ex reL Canterbury v. County Court, 151 W. Va. 1013, 158 S.E.2d 151 (1967);
State ex reL. County Court v. Demus, 148 W. Va. 398, 135 S.E.2d 352 (1964).
'7 279 S.E.2d at 630.
Is Ia at 632.
1' Id at 633.
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In attempting to increase its control over the State bureau-
cracy, the Legislature attempted to make an end run around
these formal constitutional enactment requirements." However,
this attempt to free itself of these constitutional restraints and
to step into the shoes of the administrative agencies through an
"extra-legislative control device"21 violated the separation of
powers.
The court identified three tendencies of the legislative
review mechanism which could foster legislative dominance and
erode executive power: 1) the tendency to usurp the traditional
executive role of filling in the details of general legislative
enactments; 2) the tendency to lessen the legislative incentive to
draw statutes narrowly to effect intended policy; and 3) the
tendency to centralize power in the hands of a few legislators.2
However, the court left open the question of whether these ten-
dencies could be corrected by a more narrowly drawn statutory
mechanism. It was suggested, however, that constitutional alter-
natives do exist." But the court's emphasis on the formal consti-
tutional limitations imposed upon the Legislature in enacting
law indicates that the court may hold unconstitutional any mech-
anism that does not meet formal constitutional requirements
such as the requirement of three readings, the prohibition
against legislation embracing more than one object," and the
necessity for the Governor's approval."6 If the Legislature is
limited to these requirements, it is unlikely that the Rule-Mak-
ing Review Committee mechanism will be resurrected in a more
limited form.
Legislatures already have the weapons of appropriation,
standing committees, oversight committees, investigatory
powers and participation in the appointment process. The
20 1&
ft Id., see Watson, Congress Steps Out: A Look at Congressional Control of
the Executive, 63 CAL. L. REV. 983 (1975).
" Id. at 635-36.
Id. at 635 (citing Note, Congressional Veto of Administrative Action: The
Probable Response to a Constitutional Challenge, 1976 DUKE L.J. 285; Newman
and Keaton, Congress and the Faithful Execution of Law-Should Legislators
Supervise Administrators?, 41 CAL. L. REV. 569 (1952); Watson, supra note 21;
see also Neely, supra note 3.
W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 51 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 30 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 14 (1978 Replacement Vol.).
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almost plenary power to revise, reshape or repeal statutory law
also serves as a powerful check on administrative agencies.
Agency actions and priorities can be reversed through the utiliz-
ation of all of these legislative control mechanisms. But the
mechanism provided in the 1976 amendments stretched the Leg-
islature's supervisory powers beyond these traditional modes of
control. "The power of the Legislature in checking the other
branches of government is to legislate ... when it exercises that
power it must act as a legislature through its collective wisdom
and will, within the confines of the enactment procedures man-
dated by our constitution.' '=
Although not specifically addressed in this decision, there
are many other practical considerations which limit both the ef-
fectiveness and the desirability of this type of legislative review
mechanism. First, the burdensomeness and impracticality of giv-
ing meaningful review to a plethora of complex and detailed
rules and regulations, especially by a part-time legislature, de-
creases the mechanism's utility. Second, an administrative agency
which pursues its duties aggressively is likely to make political
enemies along the way; the fear of crossing a few key legisla-
tors, such as members of a rule-making review committee, could
have a distinct chilling effect on an agency's activities. Third,
there is a potential crippling psychological effect on agency
morale caused by the uncertainty concomitant with a process in
which rules and regulations formulated must stand strict legisla-
tive scrutiny. Fourth, such a mechanism simply gives lobbyists
one more shot at gutting or stopping entirely needed regula-
tions. Fifth, the waste of time, energy, and ultimately, the tax-
payers' money in re-formulating rules and regulations which
took a great deal of time to promulgate, can be very costly.
Sixth, by requiring administrators to spend time justifying their
regulations before the legislative rule-making review committee
rather than doing their administrative duties, an agency's func-
tioning can be seriously impeded. Seventh, the focus on the
short-term appeasement of the legislative review committee
could result in the sacrifice of long-term, sequential, and compre-
hensive administrative rule-making.
The issues of the constitutionality and the practicality of
legislative veto mechanisms involve not only state concerns, but
279 S.E.2d at 634, n.7.
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federal concerns as well. The constitutional problems raised in
this case have also been raised elsewhere." However, there is by
no means agreement as to the validity of these mechanisms.9
The United States Supreme Court, when it has had an opportun-
ity to address the issue, has declined to do so." However, this re-
cent decision by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
will do a great deal to fuel the fires of those who look upon strict
legislative review of administrative actions with disfavor.
FUNDING FOR EDUCATION
In State ex reL Board of Education v. Rockefeller,1 the court
significantly expanded its protection, and even its paternalism,
2
2 See Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of Powers: The Ex-
ecutive on a Leash?, 56 No. CAR. L. REV. 423 (1978); Note, Congressional Ve'ta of
Administrative Action: The Probable Response to a Constitutional Challenge,
supra note 23, S. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF POWER
112-17 (1975); Ginnane, supra note 23; see also Scalla, Oversight and Review of
Agency Decision Making, 28 AD. L. REV. 577, 684-95 (1976); Opinion of the
Justices, 83 A.2d 738 (N.H. 1950).
Arguing in support of constitutionality are: Schwartz, The Legislative
Veto and the Constitution-A Reexamination, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 351 (1918);
Javits and Klein, Constitutional Oversight and the Legislative Veto: A Constitu-
tional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455 (1977); Miller and Knapp, The Congres-
sional Veto: Preserving the Constitutional Framework, 52 IND. L.J. 367 (1977);
Abourezk, The Congressional Veto: A Contemporary Response to Executive En-
croachment on Legislative Prerogatives, 52 IND. L.J. 323 (1977); Cooper and
Cooper, The Legislative Veto and the Constitution, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV 467
(1962); Black, The Presidency and Congress, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 841 (1975);
See also Newman and Keeton, supra note 23, at 587-88 (defending congressional
experimentation in legislative control).
In Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 1, provisions of the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 1971 which provided that before a rule of the Election Commission
could go into effect, it must first be submitted to the Senate or to the House,
which then had the power of disapproval, were challenged. The Court responded:
"Appellants make a separate attack on this qualification of the
Commission's rulemaking authority, which is but the most recent
episode in a long tug of war between the Executive and Legislative
Branches of the Federal Government respecting the permissible extent
of legislative involvement in rulemaking... Because of our holding that
the manner of appointment of the members of the Commission
precludes them from exercising the rulemaking powers in question, we
have no occasion to address this separate challenge of appellants."
424 U.S. at 240.
1 281 S.E.2d 131 (W. Va. 1981).
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of public education. The court held that, despite having the
statutory authority, the Governor may not reduce expenditures
for public education in the absence of a compelling factual re-
cord indicating the necessity of such reduction.
On April 2, 1981, as a result of the coal strike's alleged
deleterious effect on state revenues, the Governor issued a
memorandum to all state agencies requiring a 10% reduction in
fourth quarter expenditures. This order was made pursuant to
West Virginia Code § 5A-2-23,1 which provides for "pro rata"
reduction in appropriations to avoid a deficit in the general fund.
As in its recent decision in Pauley v. Kelly,' the court inter-
preted the "thorough and efficient" clause found in the West
Virginia Constitution7 as affording public education a "constitu-
tionally favored status" in this State.' This status, the court
stated, required "adequate funding" of public education.' Thus,
in order for the pro rata provisions of the statute to allow for
reductions in public education, the court stated that "the State
must develop a factual basis to show that there will be a deficit
in the general revenue fund substantial enough to necessitate
the reduction in expenditures for public education."" The court
went on to analogize this factual showing to the showing re-
quired by the United States Supreme Court decisions11 placing
an affirmative duty on school officials to demonstrate the elim-
281 S.E.2d at 136.
Id at 132.
W. VA. CODE § 5A-2-23 (1979 Replacement Vol.), provides:
If the governor determines that the amounts, or parts thereof, ap-
propriatea from the general revenue cannot be expended without creat-
ing an overdraft or deficit in the general fund, he may instruct the com-
missioner to reduce equally and pro rata all appropriations out of
general revenue in such a degree as may be necessary to prevent an
overdraft or deficit in the general fund.
255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1, provides:
The legislature shall provide, by general law, for a thorough and
efficient system of free schools.
281 S.E.2d at 133.
Id
16 Id at 135.
" Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, reh. den., 444 U.S.
887 (1979); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 401 U.S. 1, reh.
den., 403 U.S. 912 (1971).
[Vol. 84
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ination of segregaton. Unlike the United States Supreme Court,12
however, the Supreme Court of Appeals found that public educa-
tion is a fundamental right upon which the State may not imp-
inge absent the showing of a compelling state interest."
In 1959, in Board of Education v. Board of Public Works, 4 the
court dealt with the issue of the constitutionality and applicability
to public education of the predecessor statute to West Virginia
Code § 5A-2-23. The court in that case held the statute both con-
stitutional and applicable to public education. However, the
court in Rockefeller rejected the contention that this prior deci-
sion was controlling because the issue there was one of separ-
ation of powers, rather than the priority standing of public
education. However, in Board of Public Works, though not
couched in terms of "priority standing", the plaintiff challenged
not only the constitutionality of the statute, but also its ap-
plicability to public education.'5 The Board of Public Works
court found, that despite the severe effects of the pro rata re-
duction in expenditures to public education,18 that the appro-
priation to public education, "having been made from the gen-
eral revenue, is subject to the provisions of . ..," the statute
authorizing the pro rata expenditure reduction scheme.'
12 San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, reh. den., 411 U.S.
959 (1973).
1' 281 S.E.2d at 135.
It 144 W. Va. 593, 109 S.E.2d 552 (1959).
" "The petition.., alleges ... that if the provisions of the statute are valid
they do not extend or apply to appropriations made by the Legislature for state
aid to schools." 109 S.E.2d at 555.
" "The order ... has in fact disrupted the school program originally adopted
by each plaintiff during the fiscal year, has prevented the normal and customary
operation of the schools, and has caused each plaintiff to revise and alter its
original school program. It has required each plaintiff to shorten its school term,
or decrease the salaries of its teachers, or reduce its teaching force and other per-
sonnel, or eliminate essential parts of its curriculum and activities. It has also sub-
jected the schools operated by each plaintiff to the possible loss of accreditation
and has produced uncertainty and confusion in the administration of the schools
under the management and control of each plaintiff." Id. at 558.
" .1d.
" The court stated that "[t]he legislative intent in enacting that statutory
provision was to prevent a deficit in the State treasury which was the primary
purpose of the adoption of Article VI, Section 51, of the Constitution." In order to
fulfill this constitutional mandate, and pursuant to the necessary and proper
clause found in article VI, § 51(d), the Board of Public Works court found this
statutory scheme both constitutionally permissible and applicable to public educa-
tion expenditures. Id. at 558-59.
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The court found that the record presented by the Governor
did not factually demonstrate the financial necessity of
the reduction in school expenditures. Specifically, the court
cited the record's failure to: 1) identify the specific sources of
revenue loss; 2) demonstrate the current state of general re-
venues in relation to projected revenues; 3) show that the Gen-
eral Revenue Fund could not be supplemented from other
sources; and 4) identify the relative position of all state spending
units with regard to the percentage of their appropriations
already expended.19
Chief Justice Harshbarger, joined by Justice McGraw, con-
curred with the majority's judgment," but felt that the stat-
utory scheme was an unconstitutional violation of the separation
of powers.21 He cited three provisions of the State Constitution
providing legislative mechanisms for remedying budget defi-
cits,' and felt that these mechanisms were all-inclusive. Draw-
ing a sharp distinction between the appropriation and the ex-
penditure of funds, Chief Justice Harshbarger felt that the in-
terpretation of the statute in Board of Public Works" "defined a
governor's power to expend in a way that usurped that of the
19 281 S.E.2d at 136.
Id. at 137.
21 Id at 138.
W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 51(B)(5) (1978 Replacement Vol.) providing:
The legislature shall not amend the budget bill so as to create a
deficit but may amend the bill by increasing or decreasing any item
therein ...
W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 5 (1978 Replacement Vol.), providing:
The power of taxation of the legislature shall extend to provisions
for payment of the state debt, and interest thereon ... but whenever
any deficiency in the revenue shall exist in any year, it shall, at the
regular session thereof held next after the deficiency occurs, levy a tax
for the ensuing year, sufficient with the other sources of income, to
meet such deficiency, as well as the estimated expenses of such year.
W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 4 (1978 Replacement Vol.) providing:
No debt shall be contracted by this State, except to meet casual
deficits in the revenue, to redeem a previous liability of the State, to
suppress insurrection, repel invasion or defend the State in time of war;
but the payment of any liability other than that for the ordinary ex-
penses of the State, shall be equally distributed over a period of at least
twenty years.
144 W. Va. 593, 109 S.E.2d 552 (1959).
[Vol. 84
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legislature to appropriate;"' thus this interpretation should be
overruled and that statute held unconstitutional.
Justice Neely, dissenting, criticized the majority for turning
"upside-down traditional rules about burden of proof" and for
"indefensible court intervention."" Instead of requiring the peti-
tioning boards of education to show that the reduction in expen-
ditures would result in inadequate funding, the majority re-
quired the Governor to prove that his actions were necessary.
Justice Neely felt that this procedural hurdle was a "classic
method" of judicial interventionism, and that this shifting of the
burden of proof was particularly unjustified given "'the univer-
sally accepted maxim that unless proved otherwise there is a
presumption of the validity of acts done by a political officer.' "1
While Justice Neely agreed that the constitutional primacy
of public education was a "reasonable conclusion",7 he stated
that "what is not a reasonable conclusion is that a two percent
reduction in educational expenditures ... will cause a previously
thorough and efficient school system to become less than thor-
ough and efficient."28 He felt that the majority's analogy to the
school desegregation cases was inappropriate because in those
cases the petitioners bore and met the burden of proving a prima
facie case of state sanctioned segregation. No such showing was
required by the majority."
Justice Neely also felt strongly concerning the majority's
encroachment upon the authority of the executive and legis-
lative branches: "It is the Court, not the Governor, which is ac-
ting illegally."3 He felt that both the separation of powers and
political question doctrines should have prevented the judicial
dilution of the Governor's authority. He stated that "the Court
today thwarts both the legislative and executive branches by
breaching the separation of powers and substituting a judicial
preference for education over a legislative and executive pre-
281 S.E.2d at 138.
Id. at 139.
Id Citing State ex rel. Karnes v. Dadisman, 153 W. Va. 771, 172, S.E.2d
561, 567 (1970).
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ference for equality";3'T and while judicial review might be ap-
propriate in the context of an administrative agency decision "in
this case we are dealing neither with an administrative decision
nor a decision made by an unresponsive, non-elected official. The
decision in this case was made by the Governor, the State's fore-
most democratically elected official . . . in the exercise of the
discretionary authority granted him by a democratically elected
legislature."32 Thus, the conflict was a political one, and the
remedy for the petitioning school boards was the political pro-
cess, and not the judiciary.
He also felt that the majority's position violated "fundamen-
tal principles of equal protection."33 The statutory scheme pre-
vents the gubernatorial reordering of legislative priorities by
requiring "the Governor to treat all recipients of the State's
bounty equally."34 While Justice Neely felt that equal protection
justifiably serves to protect the "politically powerless", this case
involved not the judicial protection of the politically powerless,
but of a "well-organized, vested interest's raid on the State
Treasury at the expense of other legitimate, but unorganized,
powerless ... constituencies."3 The interest of equal protection
was the foundation upon which this pro rata reduction scheme
was based, and Justice Neely felt that this interest was sub-
verted by the majority's position.
Even accepting, arguendo, that the constitutional preference
for public education requires "adequate funding", the majority's
analysis gives no indication of what level of funding is adequate.
Although in Pauley v. Kelly," the court defined in great detail
what it meant by "a thorough and efficient system of schools",
these explicit criteria were not used in addressing the issue of
whether, in fact, the proposed reduction in expenditures would
3, Id. at 140; See also State ex rel. Bache & Co. v. Gainer, 154 W. Va. 499,
177 S.E.2d 10 (1973); State ex rel State Bldg. Comm'n v. Bailey, 151 W. Va. 79,
150 S.E.2d 449 (1966); Danielly v. City of Princeton, 113 W. Va. 252, 167 S.E. 620
(1933); and Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612 (1875); See generally R. Neely, How
Courts Govern America (1981).
Id. at 140.
Id. at 141.3 4 Id.
3 d.
255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979).
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prevent the achievement of any of the objectives or the provi-
sion of any of the supportive services spelled out in Pauley 7 Ap-
parently, the State school system operates at only a minimally
"adequate funding" level, if any reduction in expenditures will
result in inadequate funding.
Ancil Ramey
"We may now define a thorough and efficient system of schools: It
develops, as best the state of education expertise allows, the minds, bodies and
social morality of its charges to prepare them for useful and happy occupations,
recreation and citizenship, and does so economically.
Legally recognized elements in this definition are development in every
child to his or her capacity of (1) literacy; (2) ability to add, subtract, multiply and
divide numbers; (3) knowledge of government to the extent that the child win be
equipped as a citizen to make informed choices among persons and issues that af-
fect his own governance; (4)self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her total en-
vironment to allow the child to intelligently choose life work-to know his or her
options; (5) work-training and advanced academic training as the child may in-
telligently choose; (6) recreational pursuits; (7) interests in all creative arts, such
as music, theatre, literature, and the visual arts; (8) social ethics, both behavioral
and abstract, to facilitate compatibility with others in this society.
Implicit are supportive services: (1) good physical facilities, instructional
materials and personnel; (2) careful state and local supervision to prevent waste
and to monitor pupil, teacher and administrative competency." rd at 877.
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